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several issues. In this variant, the available amount of resource intended for each issue is 
constrained to an amount fixed a priori according to exogenous criteria. The aim is to 
distribute the amount corresponding to each issue taking into account the allocation for 
the rest of issues (issue-allocation interdependence). We name these problems 
constrained multi-issue allocation situations (CMIA). In order to tackle the solution to 
these problems, we first reinterpret some single-issue egalitarian rationing rules as a 
minimization program based on the idea of finding the feasible allocation as close as 
possible to a specific reference point. We extend this family of egalitarian rules to the 
CMIA framework. In particular, we extend the constrained equal awards rule, the 
constrained equal losses rule and the reverse Talmud rule to the multi-issue rationing 
setting, which turn out to be particular cases of a family of rules, namely the extended 
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principles (over agents and over issues) and a property based on the Lorenz dominance 
criterion. 
 
 
 
JEL Codes:  D63. 
 
 
Keywords: rationing, multi-issue, reverse Talmud rule, equal losses rule, 
egalitarian family.   
 
 
 
 
Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar  
Universitat de Barcelona 
 
Pere Timoner Lledó 
Universitat de Barcelona 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: We thank Francesc Llerena and Javier Martínez for their helpful 
comments. We also thank two anonymous referees for their highly constructive advise. 
The authors acknowledge support from research grant ECO2014-52340-P (Spanish 
Ministry of Science and Innovation) and 2014SGR40 (Government of Catalonia). The 
second author also acknowledges financial support from the APIF program (University 
of Barcelona). 
 
ISSN 1136-8365 
1 Introduction
A standard rationing situation1 (O’Neill, 1982; Aumann and Maschler, 1985)
is an allocation problem in which an amount of a (perfectly divisible) resource
(e.g., money) must be distributed among several agents, each of whom has
a claim on the resource. The problem arises when the amount to be divided
is not enough to satisfy all claims.2
Calleja et al. (2005) extend this model to incorporate situations in which
the available amount of resource must be allocated among several agents,
each of whom has several claims related to different issues. Quoting Calleja
et al. (2005, page 731):“An issue constitutes a reason on the basis of which
the estate is to be divided”. In this case, the problem also arises when the
amount of resource is not enough to satisfy all claims. These authors called
these problems multi-issue allocation situations (MIA).
In the literature, there are two basic approaches to MIA situations:
1. The first approach (e.g., Calleja et al., 2005; Gonza´lez-Alco´n et al.,
2007; Hinojosa and Ma´rmol, 2014; Hinojosa et al., 2012, 2014; Ju et
al., 2007; Lorenzo-Freire et al., 2007) provides rules that assign a single
payoff to each agent, but do not specify which proportion of this payoff
corresponds to each issue, which is not relevant in this approach.
2. The second approach (e.g., Bergantin˜os et al., 2010a, 2010b, 2011;
Borm et al., 2005; Lorenzo-Freire et al. 2010; Moreno-Ternero, 2009)
provides two-stage rules. In the first stage, the total amount of resource
is allocated to issues. That is, it is specified which proportion of the
total amount of resource will be assigned to satisfy the claims for each
specific issue. This is done by solving a single-issue rationing problem,
where the issues play the role of agents and the claim related to each
issue is the sum of agents’ claims for the corresponding issue. In a
second stage, the amount assigned to each issue (in the first stage) is
1In this chapter, we call these situations single-issue rationing problems.
2For further reading see the surveys undertaken by Thomson (2003, 2015).
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distributed among agents. The allocation within an issue is done sepa-
rately from the allocation within another issue by solving a single-issue
rationing problem where only the claims of the agents for the specific
issue are taken into account.
Formally, a MIA situation is described by means of a set of agents N =
{1, 2, . . . , n}, a set of issues M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, a list of claims c = (cji ) i∈N
j∈M
,
being cji the claim of agent i for the issue j, and an available amount of re-
source r such that r ≤∑j∈M∑i∈N cji . In the aforementioned first approach,
a single-point solution to a problem is a payoff vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn) where
xi is the (total) payoff to agent i ∈ N , without specifying which proportion of
this payoff corresponds to each issue. In the second approach, the solution is
an allocation vector x = (xji ) i∈N
j∈M
∈ RN×M+ , being xji the payoff to agent i for
the issue j with no other restriction than efficiency, i.e.
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N x
j
i = r
and claims boundedness.
In this chapter, we face multi-issue rationing problems (where agents
claim for several issues) from a different point of view. There are many
interesting economic situations in which each agent also has several claims
related to different issues, but the proportion of the available amount of
resource intended for each issue has already been fixed a priori according
to exogenous criteria. The aim of our approach is to focus on the (total)
payoff to agents (as in the first approach), but also specifying its distribution
across issues in a fair way, with the constraint that the proportion of the total
resource intended for each issue is fixed previously to the rationing process.
For instance, imagine that a Central Government has already decided
how to spent its total budget (amount of resource) into different budget
items (issues) such as public education, health care, grants to industrial sec-
tors, organization of events, security, etc. Then, suppose that the Regional
Institutions (agents) have several demands (claims) related to these items.
At this point, let us remark that the a priori allocation of the total budget to
each item (issue) might be related to the demand of each Regional Institution
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for each item, but it might response to other criteria such as assigning a large
proportion of the total budget to basic or essential services, or to strategic
sectors, etc. In any case, we assume that this distribution is already given.
That is, the budget intended for each item is constrained to an amount and
constitutes an exogenous parameter of the model. The solution is then an
allocation vector that specifies the payoff to each agent for each issue, but
respecting the a priori allocation of the total resource among the different
issues. We call these kind of problems constrained multi-issue allocation situ-
ations (CMIA). Formally, in a CMIA problem an arbitrator must allocate
different amounts r1 ≥ 0, r2 ≥ 0, . . ., rm ≥ 0 (as many as issues) of (an
homogeneous) resource among several agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n} with claims
(cji ) i∈N
j∈M
over these issues M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}. A solution assigns to each
problem a payoff for each agent within each issue x = (xji ) i∈N
j∈M
such that,
for each issue j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, the amount of resource is entirely allocated to
agents
∑n
i=1 x
j
i = r
j. Finally, the total payoff assigned to each agent i ∈ N is
the sum of the partial payoffs allocated to the agent relative to the different
issues, i.e. Xi =
∑
j∈M x
j
i , for all i ∈ N .
As mentioned above, in the second approach to MIA problems (Berganti-
n˜os et al., 2010a; Moreno-Ternero, 2009) the allocation within an issue does
not depend on the allocation for other issues. As a consequence of this,
the fairness considerations that are often associated to classical single-issue
rationing rules can not be applied to compare total payoffs to agents. In
what follows, we will try to define and analyse solutions, for our model,
that cannot be only considered fair within each issue, but also fair from the
point of view of the total payoff to agents by solving simultaneously several
rationing problems. To illustrate this point, let us consider the following
example.
Example 1 Imagine a funds allocation problem to two research groups (group
1 and group 2) who claim for financial support for the next three academic
years. The amount of money intended for each period is r1 = r2 = r3 = 150.
The claims of the groups for years 1, 2 and 3 are respectively (c11, c
1
2) =
5
(140, 20), (c21, c
2
2) = (140, 20) and (c
3
1, c
3
2) = (20, 260). This situation can be
interpreted as a CMIA problem where there are two agents (the research
groups), three issues (the three periods) and the budget corresponding to each
period has been already fixed by the institution supporting the grants. The
outcome (or solution) to this problem is a finance plan for the three-year
period.
In order to solve this inter-temporal allocation problem, imagine we are
trying to equalize gains as much as possible. We can tackle this problem
(among other options) either by considering issues one-by-one, or by aggre-
gating claims and resources and solving it as a single-issue rationing problem.
Let’s analyse these two cases.
1. Considering issues one-by-one. In order to equalize gains, we compute
the constrained equal awards solution3 in each of these single-issue ra-
tioning problems separately. That is,
x1 = CEA(r1, (c11, c
1
2)) = (130, 20), x
2 = CEA(r2, (c21, c
2
2)) = (130, 20) and
x3 = CEA(r3, (c31, c
3
2)) = (20, 130),
corresponding to years 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
Although the aggregate three-period claim (the total claim) is the same
for both agents, i.e. C1 = c
1
1 + c
2
1 + c
3
1 = 300 = c
1
2 + c
2
2 + c
3
2 = C2,
the aggregate three-period payoff (the total payoff) to agent 2 is smaller
than the aggregate three-period payoff to agent 1, i.e. X2 = x
1
2 + x
2
2 +
x32 = 170 < 280 = x
1
1 + x
2
1 + x
3
1 = X1. This example suggests that
solving independently (one-by-one) the allocation problem within each
issue might lead to “unfair” global allocations. It seems reasonable that
the distribution for an issue should be influenced by the amount received
for the rest of issues.
2. Aggregating claims and resources. The aggregate (total) claims of agents
are respectively C1 = c
1
1 + c
2
1 + c
3
1 = 300 and C2 = c
1
2 + c
2
2 + c
3
2 = 300.
3For a formal definition, see page 9.
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If we aggregate the available resources for each issue we obtain r =
r1 + r2 + r3 = 450. Then, if we apply the CEA rule to the problem
(r, (C1, C2)) we obtain (X1, X2) = CEA(450, (300, 300)) = (225, 225).
It remains to assign this total payoff of agents within issues. However,
you can check that there is no feasible allocation
(
xj1 + x
j
2 = r
j, for
all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and 0 ≤ xji ≤ cji , for all i ∈ {1, 2} and all j ∈
{1, 2, 3}) x = (xji ) i∈{1,2}
j∈{1,2,3}
such that X1 = x
1
1 + x
2
1 + x
3
1 = 225 and
X2 = x
1
2 + x
2
2 + x
3
2 = 225.
This example not only suggests that it does not seem appropriate to dis-
tribute amounts of resource separately within each issue (as in case 1), but
we cannot also dismiss issue constraints (as in case 2). The allocation within
an issue must be dependent on the allocation within other issues. To this end
and continuing with the same example, the reader can check that the alloca-
tion given by (x11, x
1
2) = (130, 20), (x
2
1, x
2
2) = (130, 20) and (x
3
1, x
3
2) = (0, 150)
is more egalitarian in the aggregate (total) payoffs (X1 = 260 and X2 = 190)
than any other feasible allocation. This allocation coincides with the exten-
sion, defined later, of the constrained equal awards rule to the multi-issue
framework.
The extension of some classical rules that we propose in this chapter are
based on finding the solution of an optimization program. To this aim, in
Section 2 we reinterpret some of the main rules for single-issue rationing
situations as a minimization program and we introduce a family of single-
issue egalitarian rules, each of which picks out the feasible allocation that
minimizes the distance to a reference point. In the same section, we also
introduce a subfamily of these rules, namely the β-egalitarian family of rules,
which coincides with the RTAL family of rules (Thomson, 2008 and van den
Brink et al., 2013). In Section 3, we focus on CMIA situations and extend
the aforementioned families of rules to the multi-issue context. Finally, we
characterize axiomatically a subfamily of the extended egalitarian rules by
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means of consistency principles (over issues and over agents) and a property
based on the Lorenz-domination criterion. In Section 4, we conclude.
2 Single-issue rationing problems
In this section we focus on single-issue (standard) rationing problems. First,
we reinterpret some single-issue rationing solutions as a minimization pro-
gram. Second, we introduce a family of egalitarian rules. Lastly, we study
whether the analysed single-issue rationing rules follows some egalitarian
principles.
2.1 Single-issue rationing rules as a minimization pro-
gram
In order to afford the multi-issue rationing problems, we first reinterpret some
of the main rules for single-issue rationing problems (where agents claim for
only one issue) as an optimization program based on the idea of finding a
feasible allocation as close as possible to a reference point.
We denote by N the set of natural numbers that we identify with the
universe of potential agents, and by N the family of all finite subsets of N.
Given S ∈ N , we denote by s the cardinality of S.
A single-issue rationing problem is a pair (r, c) where r ≥ 0 is the available
amount of resource and c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ RN+ is the vector of claims
being ci the claim of agent i ∈ N . The scarcity condition requires that
the total claim is at least as large as the available amount of resource, i.e.
r ≤ ∑i∈N ci = C. Let RN denotes the domain of all single-issue rationing
problems with agent set N . The family of all single-issue rationing problems
is R = ∪N∈NRN .
For any problem (r, c) ∈ RN with N ∈ N , the feasible set D(r, c) is
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defined as
D(r, c) :=
x ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈N xi = r and
0 ≤ xi ≤ ci for all i ∈ N
 .
It includes those efficient allocations such that no agent gets more than her
claim. A single-issue rationing rule selects a unique payoff vector F (r, c) = x
within the feasible set D(r, c).
Next, we recall two classical solutions that will be used later in this sec-
tion. For any single-issue rationing problem (r, c) ∈ RN , with N ∈ N , the
constrained equal awards (CEA) rule is defined as CEAi(r, c) = min{ci, λ}
for all i ∈ N , and the constrained equal losses (CEL) rule is defined as
CELi(r, c) = max{0, ci − λ} for all i ∈ N , where, in both cases, λ ∈ R+ is
chosen such that the resultant allocation is efficient.
In the more general context of bargaining problems,4 Pfingsten and Wa-
gener (2004) point out that solutions can be viewed as social compromises in
the sense that they select those elements among the feasible outcomes that
come as close as possible to some ideal but not achievable outcome. Close-
ness is defined by suitably defined metrics or quasi metrics on the outcome
space. In this chapter we will also follow this idea of minimizing the dis-
tance to a point; however, this point must not coincide necessarily with the
ideal outcome (claims vector). As we next see, several rationing rules can be
reinterpreted as solutions which select the feasible allocation in D(r, c) that
minimizes the euclidean distance to a given reference point.
For instance, the CEA rule can be viewed as the solution to the following
minimization program:
min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
x2i .
That is, the rule picks out the feasible allocation in D(r, c) that is the closest
to the origin (zero vector). Looking at Figure 1 (a) it is straightforward to
4Chun and Thomson (1992) study a bargaining model with claims. They consider the
claims vector as the utopia point and also consider disagreement points other than the
origin.
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realize that the same allocation is selected when we minimize the distance
from any vector with equal components (not necessarily the origin). The
proof of this result can be found in Proposition 6 in Appendix A.5
On the other hand, the CEL rule can be viewed as the solution of the
minimization program min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N(xi − ci)2. In this case, losses are split
equally from the claims vector (see Figure 1 (b) and Proposition 7 in Ap-
pendix A).
(a) (b)
Figure 1: The CEA and the CEL rules as minimization programs.
(a) The CEA rule selects the feasible allocation that minimizes the euclidean
distance to the origin. (b) The CEL rule selects the feasible allocation that is
the closest to the claims vector.
We aim to generalize this idea by selecting the feasible allocation that is
the closest to a reference point.
Definition 1 Given N ∈ N , a reference function Nα : RN+ → RN associates
5In the same line, Schummer and Thomson (1997) characterize the CEA rule as the
only solution minimizing the variance with respect to the equal split solution.
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to any vector of claims c ∈ RN a reference point
Nα(c) =
(
Nα1(c), Nα2(c), . . . , Nαn(c)
)
= (a1, a2, . . . , an) = a.
Moreover, we denote by α = (Nα)N∈N the collection of reference functions
relative to each N ∈ N , and we name it reference system α.
Let us illustrate this idea with some examples of reference systems.
Example 2 For all N ∈ N and all c ∈ RN+ ,
1. Nα(c) = c. In this case, the reference point coincides with the claims
vector.
2. Nα(c) = (0, 0, . . . , 0). In this case, the reference point coincides with
the zero vector (origin).
3. Nα(c) =
 (0, 0, . . . , 0) if
∑
i∈N ci ≤ 100
c if
∑
i∈N ci > 100
. In this case, the refer-
ence point coincides with the zero vector (origin), if the sum of claims
is bellow a threshold equal to 100, and with the claims vector, otherwise.
4. Nαi(c) = pi ∈ R, for all i ∈ N . In this case, the reference point is
constant and independent of the claims.
Given a reference system α and an agent set N ∈ N , the α-egalitarian
rule selects the feasible allocation that minimizes the euclidean distance to
the corresponding reference point. Notice that other distances could be used.
Definition 2 Given a reference system α and N ∈ N , the α-egalitarian
rule Eα assigns to any problem (r, c) ∈ RN , the unique feasible payoff vector
Eα(r, c) ∈ RN+ defined as follows:
{Eα(r, c)} := arg min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(xi − ai)2,
where ai = Nαi(c), for all i ∈ N .
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Note that, each α-egalitarian rule is well-defined since
∑
i∈N(xi − ai)2 is a
continuous and strictly convex function, and D(r, c) is a compact and con-
vex set and, consequently, the minimization program has a unique solution.
Each rule contained in this family follows an egalitarian principle since it
distributes as equal as possible the excess or the loss from the corresponding
reference point a = Nα(c).
Every α-egalitarian rule satisfies some fundamental properties as:
• resource monotonicity: if the amount of resource increases, then no
agent gets less payoff.
• path-independence: if applying the rule we obtain an initial allocation
but resource availability suddenly diminishes, the allocation that comes
from applying the rule to the new problem with the smaller level of
resource and with the original claims, is equal to the allocation that
comes from applying the rule taking into account the initial allocation
as claims.
Formal definitions of each of these properties and the proofs that show
that every α-egalitarian rule satisfies these properties are given in Definitions
21 and 25 and Propositions 8 and 11 in Appendix A.
Other properties hold under some additional requirements:
• claims monotonicity: if the claim of an agent increases, then her payoff
does not decrease.
Eα satisfies claims monotonicity if the reference system α is constant
and independent of the claims (see Case 4. of Example 2).
• consistency: if we apply a rule to a subgroup of agents, then the rule
recommends the same initial assignment.
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Eα satisfies consistency if the reference system α is consistent (for a
formal definition of a consistent reference system see Definition 24 in
Appendix A).
The definitions of these two properties and the proofs that show that α-
egalitarian rules satisfy these properties under the corresponding conditions
can be found in Definitions 22 and 23 and Propositions 9 and 10 in Appendix
A.
Finally, let us remark that there are α-egalitarian rules that do not satisfy
the classical property of equal treatment of equals (if two agents have equal
claims, then they should receive equal amounts). This is because the alloca-
tion suggested by an α-egalitarian rule does not depend only of the claims,
but also on the reference system α. In the next subsection, we introduce
a subfamily of the α-egalitarian family of rules that satisfies the classical
property of equal treatment of equals.
2.2 The β-egalitarian family of rules
An interesting subfamily of the α-egalitarian family of rules is the one that
proposes to take as reference point a proportion β ∈ [0, 1] of the claims, i.e.
for all N ∈ N , the reference system assigns Nαi(c) = β · ci, for all i ∈ N .
We denote each rule contained in this subfamily as Eβ and we name this
subfamily β-egalitarian.
Definition 3 Given β ∈ [0, 1] and N ∈ N , the β-egalitarian rule Eβ assigns
to any problem (r, c) ∈ RN , the unique feasible payoff vector Eβ(r, c) ∈ RN+
defined as follows:
{Eβ(r, c)} := arg min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(xi − β · ci)2.
The β-egalitarian family of rules allows to interpret the allocation problem
from different points of view. As Young (1994) points out on page 73 of his
book “Equity in Theory and Practice”:
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“There are two ways of looking any solution to a claims problem.
One is to focus on the amount each agents gets, that is, the gain.
The other is to look at how much each claimant fails to get, that is,
on the loss”.
The β-egalitarian family embodies the two ways in which agents perceive
an allocation. If the amount to divide r is larger than the total claim
C =
∑
i∈N ci weighted by β, i.e. r > β · C, agents perceive that they gain
something from the reference point β · c; if it is smaller, i.e. r < β ·C, agents
perceive that they lose something from the reference point β · c. Otherwise,
if r = β · C, then the reference point is feasible, i.e. β · c ∈ D(r, c), and
thus, since the closest point of the feasible set to β · c is itself, it follows that
Eβ(r, c) = β · c and so the rule proposes the proportional allocation with
respect to claims, i.e. Eβ(r, c) = ( r·ci
C
)
i∈N .
The allocation selected by a β-egalitarian rule obviously depends on how
we select β ∈ [0, 1]. We suggest the following two interpretations of the
parameter β:
1. The first interpretation states that β reflects the shared expectation of
the agents about what proportion of their claims will be satisfied. In
this case, the value of β depends on exogenous factors (e.g., estimated
scarcity of the resource, current situation of the local economy, mar-
ket situation) that we suppose are common knowledge for all agents.
Consider, for instance, a firm that goes bankrupt, and imagine each
creditor expects to recoup forty percent of her claim, i.e. β = 0.4.
Therefore, if the total assets are not enough to cover the expectations
of the creditors, i.e. r < 0.4 · C, then each creditor perceives what is
left to satisfy her expectation as a loss. On the other hand, if the total
assets exceed the expectations of the creditors, i.e. r > 0.4 · C, then
each creditor perceives what exceeds her expectation as a gain.
2. The second interpretation states that β reflects a minimum threshold,
common for all agents. That is, if an agent is assigned below this thresh-
old, then the situation of this agent worsens. Consider, for instance,
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a food supplies to refugees and suppose that the distributor estimates
the ideal amount of food that each refugee should ingest (claim) taking
into account several factors (e.g., age, sex, state of health) which de-
termine her physical condition. Then, β · ci reflects the nutrients that
the refugee i requires to ensure that her health will not get worse (e.g.,
subsistence level). Therefore, if the amount of food to be distributed in
the refugee camp is insufficient to satisfy the basic needs of the refugees,
i.e. r < β · C, then each refugee perceives what remains to cover her
basic needs as a loss. On the other hand, if the total amount of food is
enough to cover the basic needs of the refugees, i.e. r > β ·C, then each
refugee perceives what exceeds to her basic needs as an extra gain.6
The β-egalitarian family offers a compromise between the CEA and the
CEL rules. That is, both rules can be recovered at the extreme values of
β: if β = 0, any assignment is viewed as a gain and the rule coincides with
the CEA rule, i.e. if β = 0, then Eβ = CEA (see Figure 1 (a) on page 17).
If β = 1, any assignment smaller than the claim is viewed as a loss and the
rule coincides with the CEL rule, i.e. if β = 1, then Eβ = CEL (see Figure
1 (b) on page 17).
Another example of β-egalitarian rule is the reverse Talmud (RT ) rule
(Chun et al., 2001) which is an hybrid of the CEA and the CEL rules. It is
defined as
RTi(r, c) := CELi
(
min
{
r,
∑
i∈N ci
2
}
,
c
2
)
+ CEAi
(
max
{
0, r −
∑
i∈N ci
2
}
,
c
2
)
, for all i ∈ N.
6We can consider many other cases as, for instance, a distribution of irrigation water
during a drought among a group of farmers (agents). Suppose that the farmers’ needs
(claims) are estimated by using factors as the crop extension, kinds and number of plants,
etc. In this case, β reflects the smaller fraction over the needs of water to avoid that the
harvest decreases.
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This solution can be interpreted as a β-egalitarian rule when the parameter is
β = 1
2
, and thus, the reference point is half of the claims.7 That is, E 12 = RT
(see Figure 2 (a)). Another generalization of the RT rule is a family of rules
called RTAL ≡ {RT β}
β∈[0,1] (van den Brink et al., 2013). These rules
8 are
defined as follows: given β ∈ [0, 1], we have
RT β(r, c) := CEL (min {r, βC} , βc) + CEA (max {0, r − βC} , βc) .
In fact, it is straightforward to check that the family of β-egalitarian
rules coincides with the RTAL family. This coincidence allows to reinterpret
the RTAL family as an optimization program from the perspective of the
distance minimization (see Figure 2 (b)).9
7 The reverse Talmud rule is the “reverse” of a classical solution to these prob-
lems, the Talmud rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) which is defined as Ti(r, c) :=
CEAi
(
min
{
r,
∑
i∈N ci
2
}
, c2
)
+ CELi
(
max
{
0, r −
∑
i∈N ci
2
}
, c2
)
, for all i ∈ N . The dif-
ference between both rules is that the CEA and the CEL rules switch roles in their
corresponding definitions. Aumann and Maschler (1985) give an interpretation of how the
Talmud rule works. Quoting these authors: “the half-way point is a psychological water-
shed. If you get more than half your claim, your mind focuses on the full debt, and your
concern is with the size of your loss. If you get less than half, your mind writes off the
debt entirely, and is “happy” with whatever it can get; your concern is with your award”.
We can apply a similar argument to justify the reverse Talmud rule:“If you get more
than half your claim, your mind considers that you have already received quite a lot, and
any additional amount above half of the claim is considered as an extra gain. If you get
less than half, your mind considers this fact disappointing, and focuses on the debt with
respect to half of this claim”.
8The RTAL rules are also a subfamily of the class of CIC rules developed by Thomson,
2008.
9Other rules like the Talmud (T ), the Pineles (PI) and the dual Pineles (PI∗) can
be explained from the perspective of the distance minimization by a combination of two
β-egalitarian rules, since these rules are hybrids or “double” applications of the CEA and
the CEL rules. Specifically,
T (r, c) := E0 (min{r, C2 } , c2)+ E1 (max{0, r − C2 } , c2) ,
P I(r, c) := E0 (min{r, C2 } , c2)+ E0 (max{0, r − C2 } , c2) and
PI∗(r, c) := E1 (min{r, C2 } , c2)+ E1 (max{0, r − C2 } , c2) .
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: The RT rule as a minimization program and all possible β · c.
(a) The RT rule takes as reference point half of claims c2 . For the level of resource
r (that does not cover half of claims) the selected feasible allocation is viewed
as a loss from c2 . For the level of resource r
′ (that exceeds half of claims) the
selected feasible allocation is viewed as a gain from c2 . (b) All possible locations
of the reference points β · c (on the straight line joining the origin and the claims
vector c).
A feature of the β-egalitarian rules is that there is a duality relationship
between pairs of rules within this family. The duality approach relates two
rules as follows; two rules are the dual of each other if one divides what is
available in the same way as the other divides what is missing: formally, F ∗
and F are dual if F ∗(r, c) = c − F (`, c), for all (r, c) ∈ RN , where ` is the
total loss, i.e. ` = C − r. For instance, the CEA and the CEL rules are the
dual of each other.
Each β-egalitarian rule has its corresponding β∗-egalitarian dual rule, i.e.
Eβ(r, c) = c− Eβ∗(`, c).
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This statement was already proved by Thomson (2008) for the more general
class of CIC rules. Next, we prove this duality approach from the perspective
of the distance minimization.
Proposition 1 Eβ and Eβ∗ are dual rules if and only if β∗ = 1− β.
Proof. Let Eβ(r, c) = x∗ and Eβ∗(`, c) = l∗. First of all, notice that
min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(xi − β · ci)2 = min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(β · ci − xi)2 (1)
= min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(ci − xi − (1− β) · ci)2 = min
l∈D(`,c)
∑
i∈N
(li − (1− β) · ci)2,
where D(`, c) = {l ∈ RN+ |∃x ∈ D(r, c) such that l = c− x}.
Let us prove first the “only if” part. Suppose that β∗ = 1− β. Then, by
(1), we obtain that
min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(xi − β · ci)2 = min
l∈D(`,c)
∑
i∈N
(li − β∗ · ci)2.
We claim that l∗ = c− x∗. To check it, let us suppose on the contrary that
l∗ = c− z, where z ∈ D(r, c) and z 6= x∗. In this case, we would obtain∑
i∈N(zi − β · ci)2 =
∑
i∈N(ci − zi − (1− β) · ci)2 =
∑
i∈N(l
∗
i − β∗ · ci)2
<
∑
i∈N(ci − x∗i − β∗ · ci)2 =
∑
i∈N(x
∗
i − β · ci)2,
where the strict inequality follows from the uniqueness of the solution and
the last equality follows from (1). Thus, this contradicts the fact that x∗ =
Eβ(r, c). Therefore, we conclude that l∗ = c− x∗ and Eβ∗(`, c) = c−Eβ(r, c).
Next, we prove the “if” part. Let Eβ and Eβ∗ rules be the dual of each
other, i.e. l∗ = c− x∗. Since Eβ(r, c) = x∗, we have that
min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(xi − β · ci)2 =
∑
i∈N
(x∗i − β · ci)2 =
∑
i∈N
(l∗i − (1− β) · ci)2
≥ min
l∈D(`,c)
∑
i∈N
(li − (1− β) · ci)2 = min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(xi − β · ci)2,
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where the second and the last equalities follows from (1). Therefore,∑
i∈N
(l∗i − (1− β) · ci)2 = min
l∈D(`,c)
∑
i∈N
(li − (1− β) · ci)2.
Thus, we conclude that Eβ(r, c) = x∗ = c− l∗ = c− E (1−β)(`, c).

As it was shown by Thomson (2008) for the class of CIC rules, Propo-
sition 1 implies that the β-egalitarian family is closed under duality which
means that if whenever it contains a rule, it also contains its dual. Indeed,
since Eβ 6= Eβ∗ with β∗ = 1 − β for all β 6= 1
2
, the unique self-dual (dual of
itself) rule within this family is the RT = E 12 rule.
2.3 Egalitarian criteria
Parametric rules were first analysed by Young (1987). A rule is parametric
if the payoff received by an agent depends on a function of his claim and
of a parameter related to r. Young characterizes the family of parametric
rules as the only that satisfies consistency, equal treatment of equals and
continuity (small changes in the parameter should not lead to large changes
in the payoff vector). All rules within the β-egalitarian family satisfy these
three properties,10 but as we have noted above, there are α-egalitarian rules
that do not satisfy equal treatment of equals and consistency, and thus, they
are not parametric rules.11
Each α-egalitarian rule follows an egalitarian principle from its corre-
sponding reference system α, although some of these rules do not meet the
equal treatment of equals property.
To analyse the equity of an allocation, let us introduce one of the most
relevant egalitarian criterion used to evaluate income distributions: the clas-
10The proofs that show that each β-egalitarian rule satisfies consistency and equal treat-
ment of equals can be found in Propositions 10 and 12, respectively, in Appendix A. The
reader may check easily that each β-egalitarian rule is continuous.
11There are also parametric rules that are not contained in the α-egalitarian family; for
instance, consider the proportional or the Talmud rules.
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sical Lorenz criterion. In the literature of rationing problems, this criterion is
commonly applied to compare awards vectors generated by different rules.12
The classical Lorenz ordering is based on successive sums of ordered awards
as follows: given two vectors x, y ∈ RN such that ∑i∈N xi = ∑i∈N yi, we
say that x Lorenz-dominates y
(
x L y
)
if, when the coordinates of these
vectors are rearranged in a decreasing order (from large to small), and de-
noting the vectors obtained by x˜ and y˜, we have
∑k
i=1 x˜i ≤
∑k
i=1 y˜i, for all
k = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, with at least one strict inequality. Usually, if we consider
two awards vectors x, y ∈ RN , we say that x is more egalitarian in awards
than y, when x Lorenz-dominates y. That is, the largest payoff in x is smaller
than the largest payoff in y, i.e. x˜1 ≤ y˜1, the sum of the two largest payoffs in
x is smaller than the sum of the two largest payoffs in y, i.e. x˜1+x˜2 ≤ y˜1+ y˜2,
and so on and so forth.
We use the Lorenz criterion to compare not pairs of vectors, but the
corresponding difference vectors with respect to a reference point.
Given a reference point a ∈ RN , we associate to any vector x ∈ RN its
corresponding difference vector, i.e. da(x) = a−x = (a1−x1, a2−x2, . . . , an−
xn) =
(
da1(x), d
a
2(x), . . . , d
a
n(x)
) ∈ RN . We use this to compare a` la Lorenz
two difference vectors.
Definition 4 Given a reference point a ∈ RN and two vectors x, y ∈ RN
such that
∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N yi, we say that x Lorenz-dominates y from a(
x aL y
)
if
da(x) L da(y).
Notice that, if a = (0, 0, . . . , 0), then we recover the definition of the classical
Lorenz criterion. In this case, x Lorenz-dominates y
(
x 0L y
)
means that x
is more egalitarian than y from the origin.
12There are however examples in the rationing literature where Lorenz criterion is used
to measure equality from points of view other than awards. For instance, Ar´ın and Benito
(2012) compare, by means of the Lorenz criterion, sets of weighted vectors of awards and
losses and Kasajima and Velez (2011) compare, also by means of the Lorenz criterion,
claims vectors which, in their view, should be reflected in awards and losses.
20
Given a reference point a ∈ RN and taking two feasible allocations x, y ∈
RN+ , we have that x Lorenz-dominates y from a, when, being d˜a(x) and
d˜a(y) the corresponding difference vectors with their coordinates rearranged
in a decreasing order, the largest difference in x is smaller than the largest
difference in y, i.e. d˜a1(x) ≤ d˜a1(y), the sum of the two largest differences in x
is smaller than the sum of the two largest differences in y, i.e. d˜a1(x)+d˜
a
2(x) ≤
d˜a1(y) + d˜
a
2(y), and so on and so forth. When this happens, we say that x is
more egalitarian than y from a.
A particular case occurs when a = c. In this case, the vector of differences
is dc(x) = c − x and it evaluates the loss of each agent from her claim. If
x cL y, then we can say that x Lorenz-dominates y in losses or from the
claims vector.
Next, we can extend the idea of Lorenz-domination from a reference point
to the domain of rules. We say that a rule F Lorenz-dominates a rule F ′ from
a reference system if for all problem, the allocation proposed by F Lorenz-
dominates from the corresponding reference point to the allocation proposed
by F ′. Formally,
Definition 5 Given a reference system α and two rules F and F ′, we say
that a rule F Lorenz-dominates a rule F ′ from the reference system α
(
F αL
F ′
)
if, for each N ∈ N and any (r, c) ∈ RN ,
F (r, c) aL F ′(r, c),
where a = Nα(c).
Chun et al. (2001) state that the CEA rule Lorenz-dominates any other
rule from the origin, i.e. CEA 0L F , for any arbitrary rule F , or, what is
the same, the CEA rule is more egalitarian in awards (from the origin) than
any other rule. However, as we have discussed previously in Subsections 2.1
and 2.2, there are different ways in which a rule might follow an egalitarian
principle. Recall, for instance, that the CEL rule follows an egalitarian
principle in losses from the claims vector. Thus, it is natural to expect
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that the CEL rule be more egalitarian in losses than any other rule, i.e.
CEL cL F , for any arbitrary rule F . Also, given a reference system α, the
corresponding Eα rule Lorenz-dominates any other rule from the reference
system α, i.e. Eα αL F , for any arbitrary rule F . Thus, we say that the Eα
rule is more egalitarian from α than any other rule.
The Lorenz-domination from a reference point will be crucial to charac-
terize egalitarian solutions in the multi-issue context.
3 CMIA problems
Now, we turn to multi-issue rationing problems, where agents claim for sev-
eral issues and the amount of resource intended for each issue is constrained
to an amount fixed a priori according to exogenous criteria. In the first part
of this section we deal with the formal analysis of constrained multi-issue
allocation problem (CMIA). In the second part we propose egalitarian solu-
tions for this model. In the last part we carry out an axiomatic analysis of
these solutions.
3.1 Notation and definitions
Recall that the set of natural numbers N = {1, 2, . . .} denotes the universe
of potential agents (a set with an infinite number of elements) and let N be
the set of all non-empty finite subsets of N. A set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} ∈ N
describes a finite set of agents. The set M = {1, 2, . . .} denotes the set of
potential issues andM refers to the set of all non-empty finite subsets of M.
The set M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} ∈ M describes a finite set of issues.
Definition 6 Let N ∈ N be a set of agents and M ∈ M be a set of is-
sues. A constrained multi-issue allocation problem (CMIA) is a pair (r, c),
where r = (rj)j∈M ∈ RM+ is the vector of resources (one per issue) and
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c = (cji ) i∈N
j∈M
∈ RN×M+ is the vector of claims such that, for all issue j ∈M ,
rj ≤
∑
i∈N
cji (scarcity conditions (one per issue)).
The quantity rj represents the amount of resource intended for the issue j
and cji represents the amount that the agent i ∈ N claims according to the
issue j ∈ M . The class of CMIA problems with set of agents N and set
of issues M is denoted by MRN×M and we write the family of all these
problems as MR = ∪N ∈ N
M∈M
MRN×M . Notice that a single-issue rationing
problem is a CMIA problem with |M | = 1.
The amount of resource intended for each issue is fixed a priori (pre-
viously to the rationing process) which makes the difference with respect
to the classical multi-issue allocation (MIA) model (e.g., Calleja et al.,
2005; Moreno-Ternero, 2009). Thus, in a CMIA problem, an allocation
v = (vji ) i∈N
j∈M
∈ RN×M is efficient if the amount of resource intended for each
issue is entirely assigned to agents, i.e.
∑
i∈N v
j
i = r
j, for all j ∈ M . We
denote by vj = (vj1, v
j
2, . . . , v
j
n) the vector relative to issue j ∈ M and by
v|T = (v
j
i ) i∈T
j∈M
∈ RT×M the vector v restricted to the members of T .
Definition 7 A rule F onMR is a function which associates to each CMIA
problem (r, c) ∈ MRN×M , with N ∈ N and M ∈ M, a unique payoff vec-
tor x = F(r, c) ∈ RN×M+ within the feasible set D(r, c) which includes those
efficient allocations such that no agent gets more than her claim. That is,
D(r, c) :=
x = (xji) i∈Nj∈M ∈ RN×M+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈N x
j
i = r
j, for all j ∈M and
xji ≤ cji , for all i ∈ N and all j ∈M

We denote by F ji (r, c) ∈ R+ the payoff to agent i ∈ N according to the issue
j ∈M .
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3.2 Egalitarian multi-issue allocation rules
Next we extend the α-egalitarian family of rules to the multi-issue framework.
Similarly to the case of single-issue rationing problems we define a reference
point, for the multi-issue framework, as follows.
Definition 8 Given N ∈ N and M ∈ M, a reference function MNα :
RN×M → RN×M associates to any vector of claims c ∈ RN×M+ a reference
point MNα(c) =
(
M
N α
j
i (c)
)
i∈N
j∈M
=
(
aji
)
i∈N
j∈M
= a ∈ RN×M being aji the reference
of agent i according to issue j.
Moreover, we denote by α = (MNα)N∈N
M∈M
the collection of reference func-
tions relative to each N ∈ N and each M ∈ M, and we call it multi-issue
reference system α.
Payoffs to agents within each issue will be evaluated (as gains or losses)
with respect to reference points. If no confusion arises, we write α = 0
(α = 1) to mean the multi-issue reference system α such that MNα(c) = 0 =
(0, 0, . . . , 0)
(
M
Nα(c) = 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1)
)
, for all N ∈ N and all M ∈M.
In Example 1 we have discussed that there is a trade off between solving
separately the allocation within each issue and solving the problem when we
focus on the total payoff to agents. The approach we adopt in this chapter
is to prioritize the total payoff to agents and, after that, focusing on the
allocation within each issue. This assumption implies that the extensions of
the α-egalitarian rules are defined by means of two stages:
1. In the first stage, the extension of the α-egalitarian rule selects the
feasible vector of total payoffs
(∑
j∈M x
j
i
)
i∈N which minimizes the eu-
clidean distance to the aggregate reference point
(∑
j∈M a
j
i
)
i∈N . This
can be viewed as the solution of the following minimization program:
arg min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(∑
j∈M
xji −
∑
j∈M
aji
)2
.
We denote the set of solutions of this program by Dα(r, c). Notice that
this set is non-empty, compact and convex, since we are minimizing a
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convex function over a compact and convex domain. The set Dα(r, c)
contains, in general, more than one allocation vector, but all of them
have the same vector of total payoffs. That is,
for all x,y ∈ Dα(r, c), it holds
∑
j∈M
xji =
∑
j∈M
yji , for all i ∈ N. (2)
Notice that, if we denote the vector of total payoffs to agents as X =
(Xi)i∈N = (
∑
j∈M x
j
i )i∈N , the function to be minimized in the first stage
can be rewritten as a function of only n variables
f(x) =
∑
i∈N
(∑
j∈M
(
xji − aji
))2
=
∑
i∈N
(
Xi −
∑
j∈M a
j
i
)2
= F (X1, X2, . . . , Xn).
The function F is strictly convex and the optimization program
min F (X)
s.t. X ∈
{
Y ∈ RN+
∣∣∣∃x ∈ D(r, c) : Yi = ∑
j∈M
xji for all i ∈ N
}
has a unique solution X∗ = (X∗i )i∈N . Since f(x) = F (X), for all
x ∈ D(r, c), and X∗ is unique, it follows that ∑j∈M xji = X∗i , for all
i ∈ N and all x ∈ Dα(r, c).
2. In the second stage the rule selects, among the set of allocations ob-
tained in the first one, a payoff vector that aims to distribute payoffs
across issues in an egalitarian way from a = MNα(c). This is carried out
by solving the following optimization program
arg min
x∈Dα(r,c)
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(
xji − aji
)2
,
where the differences between payoffs and references (for all agents
according to each issue) are overall minimized. The solution is unique
since the function
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(
xji − aji
)2
is strictly convex and the
domain Dα(r, c) is also compact and convex.
25
Definition 9 Given a multi-issue reference system α, N ∈ N and M ∈M,
the extended α-egalitarian rule Êα assigns to any problem (r, c) ∈MRN×M ,
the unique feasible payoff vector Êα(r, c) ∈ RN×M+ defined as follows:
{Êα(r, c)} := arg min
x∈Dα(r,c)
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(
xji − aji
)2
,
where aji =
M
N α
j
i (c), for all i ∈ N and all j ∈M , and
Dα(r, c) := arg min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(∑
j∈M
xji −
∑
j∈M
aji
)2
.
Let us illustrate the aplication of an extended α-egalitarian rule with an
example.
Example 3 Consider the inter-temporal allocation problem described in Ex-
ample 1 where years are interpreted as issues. Suppose that the reference for
an agent relative to each year (issue) is given by the three-year average claim
of the agent (truncated by her own claim). That is, for all i = {1, 2} and all
j = {1, 2, 3},
aji =
M
N α
j
i (c) = min
{
c1i + c
2
i + c
3
i
3
, cji
}
.
Therefore, the reference point corresponding to each year is (a11, a
1
2) =
(100, 20), (a21, a
2
2) = (100, 20) and (a
3
1, a
3
2) = (20, 100). The extended α-
egalitarian solution is computed as follows:
(i) In a first stage, we minimize
[
x11 + x
2
1 + x
3
1 − (100 + 100 + 20)
]2
+[
x12 + x
2
2 + x
3
2 − (20 + 20 + 100)
]2
subject to x ∈ D(r, c). The solution
to this problem is any payoff vector within the set
Dα(r, c) =
x ∈ D(r, c)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ x
1
1 + x
2
1 + x
3
1 = 265
x12 + x
2
2 + x
3
2 = 185
 .
Notice that the set Dα(r, c) contains more than one vector, for instance,
(x11, x
1
2;x
2
1, x
2
2;x
3
1, x
3
2) = (132.5, 17.5; 132.5, 17.5; 0, 150), or
(x11, x
1
2;x
2
1, x
2
2;x
3
1, x
3
2) = (131, 19; 131, 19; 3, 147).
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(ii) In a second stage, we minimize (x11 − 100)2 + (x21 − 100)2 + (x31 −
20)2 + (x12 − 20)2 + (x22 − 20)2 + (x32 − 100)2 subject to x ∈ Dα(r, c).
Solving this program we obtain the next unique allocation
Êα(r, c) = (x11, x
1
2;x
2
1, x
2
2;x
3
1, x
3
2) = (130, 20; 130, 20; 5, 145).
As in the single-issue case, an interesting subfamily of the extended α-
egalitarian family is the one which proposes to take as reference point pro-
portions of the claims.
Definition 10 Given β = (βj)j∈M ∈ [0, 1]M , N ∈ N and M ∈ M, the
extended β-egalitarian rule Êβ assigns to any problem (r, c) ∈MRN×M , the
unique feasible payoff vector Êβ(r, c) defined as follows:
Êβ(r, c) := Êα(r, c),
where MN α
j
i (c) = β
j · cji , for all i ∈ N and all j ∈M .
Notice that, βj ∈ [0, 1] represents the proportion of the claims according to
the issue j ∈M .
Some interesting cases of extended β-egalitarian rules are those that arise
when β = 0 = (0, 0, ..., 0), β = 1 = (1, 1, ...1), or β = 1
2
= (1
2
, 1
2
, . . . , 1
2
). In
case β = 0, the corresponding reference point is a = 0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0) and
the payoff assigned to any agent for any issue is considered entirely as a gain.
In case β = 1, the corresponding reference point is a = c and what is left
from achieving full claims are perceived as a loss. In case β = 1
2
, half of the
claims becomes the reference point. Then, in parallel to the single-issue case,
some examples of extended β-egalitarian rules are the following.
Definition 11 The extended constrained equal awards (ĈEA) rule is the
extended β-egalitarian rule that takes βj = 0, for all j ∈M , i.e. ĈEA := Ê0.
The extended constrained equal losses (ĈEL) rule takes βj = 1, for all
j ∈ M , i.e. ĈEL := Ê1, and the extended reverse Talmud (R̂T ) rule takes
βj = 1
2
, for all j ∈M , i.e. R̂T := Ê 12 .
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Notice that, if there is only one issue, i.e. |M | = 1, each of these rules
corresponds to the definition of its corresponding single-issue solution. Let
us illustrate the application of these three extended β-egalitarian rules with
an example.
Example 4 Consider the two-person and three-issue CMIA problem(
(r1, r2, r3), (c11, c
1
2; c
2
1, c
2
2; c
3
1, c
3
2)
)
=
(
(150, 150, 150), (130, 50; 90, 100; 80, 150)
)
.
As the reader may check, the allocations assigned by the ĈEA, the ĈEL and
the R̂T rules are
ĈEA(r, c) = (x11, x
1
2;x
2
1, x
2
2;x
3
1, x
3
2) = (100, 50; 62.5, 87.5; 62.5, 87.5),
ĈEL(r, c) = (x11, x
1
2;x
2
1, x
2
2;x
3
1, x
3
2) = (115, 35; 70, 80; 40, 110) and
R̂T (r, c) = (x11, x
1
2;x
2
1, x
2
2;x
3
1, x
3
2) = (100, 50; 70, 80; 55, 95).
Notice that the allocation suggested by the ĈEL rule is the most egalitarian
possible distribution in losses, since the total loss assigned to both agents is
the same, i.e. c11+c
2
1+c
3
1−(x11+x21+x31) = 75 = c21+c22+c32−(x12+x22+x32), and
the losses assigned to both agents within each issue coincide, i.e. c11 − x11 =
15 = c12−x12, c21−x21 = 20 = c22−x22 and c31−x31 = 40 = c32−x32. In fact, these
allocations coincide with the distribution that results of applying separately
the CEL rule within each issue; but this is just a coincidence and, in general,
it does not hold.
3.3 Axiomatic analysis
In the previous subsection, we have introduced extended α-egalitarian rules
as natural extensions of the corresponding single-issue rationing rules viewed
as a minimization program. Next, we analyse some properties that are sat-
isfied by these rules and we provide an axiomatic characterization for a sub-
family of the extended α-egalitarian family of rules.
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The first property that we study is consistency. In a broad sense, consis-
tency requires that the solution to a full problem does not change if we apply
the same solution to a properly defined subproblem. Consistency has been
extensively analysed within the area of the design of allocation rules, play-
ing a central role in the corresponding literature. It was introduced in the
context of single-issue rationing problems by Aumann and Maschler (1985).
Quoting Thomson (2012), page 392,
“Consistency is, first of all, the desire for something like regularity,
coherence and predictability. (...) Moreover, properties of this type
are often thought of as fundamental for a fair society.”
In the multi-issue context the concept of subproblem can be understood
either as a reduction in the number of agents, or as a reduction in the number
of issues. We first focus on the reduction of the number of agents (consistency
over agents). The consistency principle has been described by some authors
not just only as a robustness principle, but also as a fairness principle (see
the survey undertaken by Thomson, 2011). It is a powerful property that ex-
presses the invariance of a solution with respect to any change in population,
linking the solution for a given society N and its subsocieties, all S ⊆ N . In
the context of multi-issue rationing its formal definition is as follows.
Definition 12 A rule F on MR is consistent over agents if for all (r, c) ∈
MRN×M and all T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, it holds
F(r, c)|T = F
((
rj −
∑
i∈N\T
xji
)
j∈M , c|T
)
,
where x = F(r, c).
Notice that a rule is consistent over agents if the payoff assigned to each
agent in a subset T ⊆ N remains unaltered if we re-evaluate this payoff
according to the same rule when the agents in N \T leave with their intended
allocations.
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To ensure that each extended α-egalitarian rule satisfies consistency over
agents we need that its multi-issue reference system α is also consistent. The
definition follows.
Definition 13 A multi-issue reference system α is consistent if, for all
T,N ∈ N with T ⊆ N and all M ∈ M we have MN αji (z)|T = MT αji (z|T ),
for all z ∈ RN×M , all j ∈M and all i ∈ T .
Proposition 2 If the multi-issue reference system α is consistent, then the
corresponding Êα rule is consistent over agents.
Proof. Let (r, c) ∈ RN×M be an arbitrary CMIA problem and let us write
x = Êα(r, c), where α is an arbitrary consistent multi-issue reference system
such that MNα(c) = (a
j
i ) i∈N
j∈M
. By definition of the rule,
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(xji − aji )2 <
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(zji − aji )2, (3)
for all z ∈ Dα(r, c) such that z 6= x. Let T ⊆ N be an arbitrary subset
of agents and y = Êα
((
rj −∑i∈N\T xji)j∈M , c|T). Suppose on the contrary
that
x|T = Êα(r, c)|T 6= y.
To reach a contradiction, let us first prove
x|T ∈ Dα
((
rj −
∑
i∈N\T
xji
)
j∈M , c|T
)
. (4)
To check this, suppose that x|T /∈ Dα
((
rj −∑i∈N\T xji)j∈M , c|T). Then,
since y ∈ Dα
((
rj −∑i∈N\T xji)j∈M , c|T) and α is consistent (MNα(c)|T =
M
T α(c|T ) = (a
j
i ) i∈T
j∈M
)
, we would obtain
∑
i∈T
(∑
j∈M
(
yji − aji
))2
<
∑
i∈T
(∑
j∈M
(
xji − aji
))2
and thus,
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∑
i∈T
(∑
j∈M
(
yji − aji
))2
+
∑
i∈N\T
(∑
j∈M
(
xji − aji
))2
<
∑
i∈N
(∑
j∈M
(
xji − aji
))2
. (5)
However, since
(
y,x|N\T
) ∈ D(r, c), the inequality (5) contradicts that x ∈
Dα(r, c), and (4) holds.
Now, since α is consistent, Êα assigns a unique solution and taking (4)
into account, we have∑
i∈T
∑
j∈M
(yji − aji )2 <
∑
i∈T
∑
j∈M
(xji − aji )2. (6)
On the other hand, by (4), we know that
x|T ∈ Dα
((
rj −
∑
i∈N\T
xji
)
j∈M , c|T
)
,
which implies that∑
i∈T
(∑
j∈M
(
yji − aji
))2
=
∑
i∈T
(∑
j∈M
(
xji − aji
))2
and thus,
∑
i∈T
(∑
j∈M
(
yji − aji
))2
+
∑
i∈N\T
(∑
j∈M
(
xji − aji
))2
=
∑
i∈N
(∑
j∈M
(
xji − aji
))2
. (7)
Finally, from
(
y,x|N\T
) ∈ D(r, c) and (7), we have that (y; x|N\T ) ∈
Dα(r, c) and∑
i∈T
∑
j∈M
(yji − aji )2 +
∑
i∈N\T
∑
j∈M
(xji − aji )2 <
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(xji − aji )2,
where the inequality follows from (6), contradicting (3). This conclude the
proof.

Note that, since the multi-issue reference system corresponding to any ex-
tended β-egalitarian rule is consistent and this family is contained in the ex-
tended α-egalitarian class, then every Êβ rule is consistent over agents. How-
ever, they are not the only extended α-egalitarian consistent (over agents)
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rules. For instance, observe that MN α
j
i (c) = β
j · cji + k, for all i ∈ N and all
j ∈M , where k ∈ R, is also a consistent multi-issue reference system.
In order to connect multi-issue rationing rules with single-issue rationing
rules it is important to check whether the allocation proposed by a multi-
issue rule coincides for any issue with the output of a single-issue rationing
rule applied to a reduced problem to the corresponding issue. Specifically, we
study the issue-consistency of rules with respect to single-issue α-egalitarian
rules.
Definition 14 Let F be a rule on MR and α be a multi-issue reference
system. We say F is one-issue α-consistent if for all (r, c) ∈MRN×M with
N ∈ N and M ∈M, we have that, for each j ∈M ,
xj = Eθ(rj, cj),
where (xj)j∈M = x = F(r, c) and θ is a (single-issue) reference system sat-
isfying
Nθ(c
j) =
aji − ∑
k∈M\{j}
(
xki − aki
)
i∈N
,
where aki =
M
N α
k
i (c), for all i ∈ N and all k ∈M .
A rule F is one-issue α-consistent if it predicts an egalitarian allocation
within each issue relative to a new reference system θ, that depends on α.
The new reference point associated within each issue Nθ(c
j) is the result
of subtracting from the initial reference point aj the net amounts (w.r.t.
the references) received by agents for other issues
∑
k∈M\{j}
(
xk − ak). This
adjustment means that agents’ perception about the allocation for a certain
issue j depends on what they have received for the rest of issues M \ {j}.
Let us illustrate this point with an example.
Example 5 Consider the 2-person and 2-issue CMIA problem, where
(r1, r2) = (3, 3) and cji = 2, for all i ∈ N = {1, 2} and all j ∈M = {1, 2}.
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Let us suppose that a rule F assigns to this problem the allocation
F(r, c) = (x11, x12;x21, x22) = (2, 1; 1, 2). (8)
Let us check that this allocation satisfies one-issue 1-consistency,13 i.e. taking
as initial reference point a = 1 = (a11, a
1
2; a
2
1, a
2
2) = (1, 1; 1, 1).
If we focus on issue j = 1, the corresponding initial reference point is
a1 = (a11, a
1
2) = (1, 1). Suppose that agents have already received a net payoff
for issue j = 2 equal to (x21− a21, x22− a22) = (0, 1). Then, the initial reference
point a1 is modified as follows:
Nθ(c
1) =
(
a11 − (x21 − a21), a12 − (x22 − a22)
)
= (1− 0, 1− 1) = (1, 0).
Therefore, as the reader can check,
{(x11, x12)} = {ÊNθ(c1)(r1, c1)} = arg min
y∈D(3,(2,2))
(y11 − 1)2 + (y12 − 0)2 = {(2, 1)},
and thus, the allocation for issue j = 1 does not change
(
see (8)
)
. A similar
argument can be used to show that the allocation for issue j = 2 does not
change. Thus, one-issue 1-consistency holds. A graphical representation of
this fact can be found in Figure 3.
The next proposition characterizes the set of allocations that are the
outcome of a rule satisfying one-issue α-consistency.
Proposition 3 Let F be a multi-issue rule and α a multi-issue reference
system. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
1. F is one-issue α-consistent.
2. For each N ∈ N , each M ∈M and any (r, c) ∈MRN×M ,
F(r, c) ∈ Dα(r, c) = arg min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(∑
j∈M
(
xji − aji
))2
,
where aji =
M
N α
j
i (c), for all i ∈ N and all j ∈M .
13See page 24 for the definition of one-issue 1-consistency.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: One-issue 1-consistency.
(a) For issue j = 1 the initial reference point moves downwards from a1 to Nθ(c
1)
subtracting the net payoffs received for issue j = 2, i.e. Nθ(c
1) =
(
a11 − (x21 −
a21), a
1
2 − (x22 − a22)
)
= (1, 0). (b) For issue j = 2 the initial reference point moves
to the left from a2 to Nθ(c
2) subtracting the net payoffs received for issue j = 1,
i.e. Nθ(c
2) =
(
a21 − (x11 − a11), a22 − (x12 − a12)
)
= (1− 1, 1− 0) = (0, 1).
Proof. (2.⇒ 1.) Let x∗ = F(r, c) ∈ arg min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(∑
k∈M
(
xki − aki
))2
, where
aki =
M
N α
k
i (c), for all i ∈ N and all k ∈M , and take an arbitrary issue j ∈M .
Then, for all xj ∈ D(rj, cj),
∑
i∈N
(∑
k∈M
(
x∗ki − aki
))2 ≤ min
x∈D(rj ,cj)
∑
i∈N
(
xji +
∑
k∈M\{j}
x∗ki −
∑
k∈M
aki
)2
.
Therefore, x∗j = arg min
x∈D(rj ,cj)
∑
i∈N
(
xji − aji +
∑
k∈M\{j}
(
x∗ki − aki
))2
for all j ∈
M . Taking a reference system θ such that
Nθ(c
j) =
aji − ∑
k∈M\{j}
(
xki − aki
)
i∈N
we conclude that x∗j = Eθ(rj, cj).
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(1.⇒ 2.) Let x∗ = F(r, c). For any arbitrary j ∈ M and by one-issue
α-consistency, we have that
x∗j = Eθ(rj, cj) with Nθ(cj) =
(
aji −
∑
k∈M\{j}
(
xki − aki
) )
i∈N
.
Hence, x∗j = arg min
x∈D(rj ,cj)
∑
i∈N
(
xji − aji +
∑
k∈M\{j}
(
x∗ki − aki
))2
.
This minimization problem is a convex non-linear program. Then x∗j
satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions.14 That is, there exist
λ∗j ∈ RN , µ∗j ∈ RN and δ∗j ∈ R such that
•
∇xjL (x∗j, λ∗j, µ∗j, δ∗j) =
(
2
(
xji − aji +
∑
k∈M\{j}(x
∗k
i − aki )
)
−λ∗j + µ∗j + δ∗j
)
i∈N
= ~0,
where L (xj, λj, µj, δj) =
∑
i∈N
((
xji − aji +
∑
k∈M\{j}(x
∗k
i − aki )
)2
−(λji (−xji ))+ (µji (xji − cji )))
+δj
(∑
i∈N x
j
i − rj
)
.
• x∗j ∈ D(rj, cj).
• λ∗ji ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and µ∗ji ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N.
• λ∗ji
( − x∗ji) = 0 for all i ∈ N , µ∗ji(xji − cji) = 0 for all i ∈ N and
δ∗j
(∑
i∈N x
j
i − rj
)
= 0.
On the other hand, since the minimization program
arg min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(∑
j∈M
(
xji − aji
))2
is also a convex non-linear program, we have that there exist λ =
(
λki
)
i∈N
k∈M
∈
RN×M , µ =
(
µki
)
i∈N
k∈M
∈ RN×M and δ = (δk)k∈M ∈ RM such that
14As the reader may verify, the regular conditions are satisfied since all the constrains
are linear (Karlin conditions - see Borrell (1989) page 204).
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• ∇xL (x, λ, µ, δ) =
(
2
(∑
k∈M
(
xki − aki
))− λ+ µ+ δ)
i∈N
= ~0,
where L (x, λ, µ, δ) =
∑
i∈N
((∑
k∈M(x
k
i − aki )
)2 −∑k∈M (λki (−xki ))
+
∑
k∈M
(
µki (x
k
i − cki )
))
+
∑
k∈M δ
k
(∑
i∈N x
k
i − rk
)
.
• x ∈ D(r, c).
• λki ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and all k ∈ M and µki ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and all
k ∈M .
• λki (−xki ) = 0 for all i ∈ N and all k ∈M , µki (xki − cki ) = 0 for all i ∈ N
and all k ∈M and δk(∑i∈N xki − rk) = 0 for all k ∈M .
However, when
λ = (λ∗1, λ∗2, . . . , λ∗m), µ = (µ∗1, . . . , µ∗m) and δ = (δ∗1, δ∗2, . . . , δ∗m),
we observe that x∗ = (x∗ji ) i∈N
j∈M
is a critical point of the minimization program.
Since this is a convex program, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions
are also sufficient. Therefore, we conclude that x∗ minimizes this program,
and thus,
x∗ = arg min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(∑
j∈M
(
xji − aji
))2
.

Proposition 3 states that any one-issue α-consistent solution must be
taken out from the set Dα(r, c). Since this set is obtained by minimizing
the euclidean distance from the aggregate reference point
(∑
j∈M a
j
i
)
i∈N to
the vector of total payoffs
(∑
j∈M x
j
i
)
i∈N , we can conclude that one-issue
α-consistent solutions are egalitarian in aggregate from
(∑
j∈M a
j
i
)
i∈N .
On the other hand, we know by (2) that all allocations within the set
Dα(r, c) have the same vector of total payoffs, that is, for all x,y ∈ Dα(r, c),∑
j∈M x
j
i =
∑
j∈M y
j
i , for all i ∈ N . In order to discriminate between alloca-
tions that have the same vector of total payoffs, let us introduce the concept
of vector of payoff differences.
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Definition 15 Let x = (xji ) i∈N
j∈M
∈ RN×M be a multi-issue payoff vector. The
vector of payoff differences relative to x, ∆x ∈ RM+ , is defined as follows:
∆x :=
(
∆jx
)
j∈M =
(
max
i∈N
xji −min
i∈N
xji
)
j∈M
∈ RM+ .
Moreover, we denote by ∆˜x the vector obtained from ∆x by rearranging its
coordinates in a decreasing order (from large to small).15
The payoff difference ∆jx expresses how different are the payoffs to agents
according to x within the issue j. The smaller payoff difference, the more
egalitarian allocation. This idea was already suggested by Schummer and
Thomson (1997) for single-issue rationing problems [Proposition 3, page 336]:
“For any bankruptcy problem, the difference between the largest
amount received by any agent and the smallest such amount is
strictly smaller at the CEA allocation than at any other feasible
allocation at which no agent receives more than his claim.”
The vector ∆˜x puts the stress on larger differences assigning them to the
first components of the vector.
As we have pointed out before, the Lorenz criterion is widely used to
compare payoff vectors with the same efficiency level. In the multi-issue
context, we will apply this criterion to discriminate between pairs of payoff
vectors x and z that assign the same vector of total payoffs, i.e.
∑
j∈M x
j
i =∑
j∈M z
j
i , for all i ∈ N .
Definition 16 Given a problem (r, c) ∈ MRN×M and two payoff vectors
x, z ∈ D(r, c) such that16 ∑j∈M zji = ∑j∈M xji , for all i ∈ N , we say that x
multi-issue Lorenz-dominates z in awards
(
x0mz
)
if
k∑
j=1
∆˜x
j ≤
k∑
j=1
∆˜z
j
, for all k ∈M,
15This means that ∆˜x
1
= ∆j1x ≥ ∆˜x
2
= ∆j2x ≥ . . . ≥ ∆˜x
m
= ∆jmx , where
ϑ = (j1, j2, . . . , jm) is a permutation of elements of M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
16Notice that, by efficiency,
∑
i∈N z
j
i = r
j =
∑
i∈N x
j
i , for all j ∈M .
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with at least one strict inequality.17
This property basically states that x multi-issue Lorenz-dominates z in
awards, when the largest payoff difference in x is smaller than the largest
payoff difference in z, i.e. ∆˜x
1 ≤ ∆˜y
1
, the sum of the two largest payoff
differences in x is smaller than the two largest payoff differences in z, i.e.
∆˜x
1
+∆˜x
2 ≤ ∆˜y
1
+∆˜y
2
, and so on and so forth. When this happens, we can
say that x is more egalitarian in awards across issues than z. Notice that
multi-issue Lorenz-domination only discriminates when agents claim for at
least two issues, |M | ≥ 2.
Let us illustrate the multi-issue Lorenz criterion with an example.
Example 6 Consider the 3-person and 3-issue CMIA problem defined by
r1 = 40, r2 = 60 and r3 = 40 with claims c1 = (40, 40, 40), c2 = (40, 20, 40)
and c3 = (20, 50, 20). Table 1 describes the allocation for each agent and each
issue according to payoff vectors x and z:
x = (x11, x
1
2, x
1
3;x
2
1, x
2
2, x
2
3;x
3
1, x
3
2, x
3
3) = (10, 10, 20; 10, 30, 20; 10, 20, 10) and
z = (z11 , z
1
2 , z
1
3 ; z
2
1 , z
2
2 , z
2
3 ; z
3
1 , z
3
2 , z
3
3) = (0, 20, 20; 15, 30, 15; 15, 10, 15).
Notice that, the total payoff to agent 1 is the same in both payoff vectors,
and equal to 30; the same remark applies to agents 2 and 3, being the total
payoffs 60 and 50, respectively. The red box indicates the maximum payoff
within the corresponding issue (column). The blue box indicates the mini-
mum payoff within the corresponding issue (column). The vectors of payoff
differences ∆x and ∆y are indicated at the bottom of Table 1. Rearranging
in a decreasing order the components of these vectors we get
∆˜x = (20, 10, 10) and ∆˜y = (20, 15, 5).
Since ∆˜x
1
= 20 = ∆˜z
1
, ∆˜x
1
+ ∆˜x
2
= 30 < ∆˜z
1
+ ∆˜x
2
= 35 and ∆˜x
1
+ ∆˜x
2
+
∆˜x
3
= ∆˜z
1
+∆˜x
2
+∆˜z
3
= 40, and by Definition 16, we conclude that x0mz.
17Notice that, in general,
∑
j∈M ∆x
j does not coincide with
∑
j∈M ∆z
j .
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x: ISSUE z: ISSUE
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 10 10 10 30 1 0 15 15 30
A
G
E
N
T 2 10 30 20 60
A
G
E
N
T 2 20 30 10 60
3 20 20 10 50 3 20 15 15 50
40 60 40 40 60 40
∆x = (10, 20, 10) ∆z = (20, 15, 5)
Table 1: A comparison between two vectors of payoff differences.
Next, we extend the idea of multi-issue Lorenz-domination in awards to
the domain of rules. We say that a rule F multi-issue Lorenz-dominates a
rule F̂ in awards if, for any problem, the allocation proposed by F multi-issue
Lorenz-dominates in awards the allocation proposed by F̂ .
Definition 17 Given two rules F and F̂ , we say that a rule F multi-issue
Lorenz-dominates a rule F̂ in awards (F0mF̂) if, for all N ∈ N , all M ∈M
and any (r, c) ∈MRN×M ,
F(r, c)0mF̂(r, c).
Let us remark that the definition of multi-issue Lorenz-domination in
awards implies that two payoff vectors can only be compared if they assign
the same vector of total payoffs. This means that a rule F might multi-
issue Lorenz-dominate another rule F̂ in awards if, for any problem (r, c),∑
j∈M F ji (r, c) =
∑
j∈M F̂ ji (r, c), for all i ∈ N .
Next, we focus on multi-issue Lorenz-domination in awards between pay-
off vectors for the two-person case (|N | = 2). The following proposition
states that, for two-person problems, the allocation suggested by the ĈEA
rule multi-issue Lorenz-dominates in awards any other payoff vector with the
same vector of total payoffs.
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Proposition 4 Let it be (r, c) ∈ MRN×M with |N | = 2 and let x =
ĈEA(r, c). Then, it holds
x0mz, for all z ∈ D(r, c) with
∑
j∈M
zji =
∑
j∈M
xji , for all i ∈ N.
Proof. Assume N = {1, 2}. We must prove that, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
k∑
j=1
∆˜x
j ≤
k∑
j=1
∆˜z
j
, (9)
for all z ∈ D(r, c) with ∑j∈M zji = ∑j∈M xji , for all i ∈ N , with at least one
strict inequality.
First of all, we claim that the sum of all payoff differences relative to x
is smaller than the sum of all payoff differences relative to z.
Claim 1
∑
j∈M
∆jx ≤
∑
j∈M
∆jz, for all z ∈ D(r, c) with
∑
j∈M
zji =
∑
j∈M
xji , for all
i ∈ N.
The proof of this claim is consigned into Appendix B.
To check (9) for any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m−1}, let us suppose, w.l.o.g., that the
vector of differences ∆x is already ordered in a non-increasing way, ∆˜x = ∆x.
As there might exist ties between some differences, we suppose additionally
that
if ∆jx = ∆
j′
x for some j, j
′ ∈M with j < j′, (10)
then, either
[
∆jx ≤ ∆jz
]
or
[
∆jx > ∆
j
z and ∆
j′
x > ∆
j′
z
]
.
Next, we prove by induction on k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m− 2} that
k∑
j=1
∆jx ≤
k∑
j=1
∆jz, for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m− 1}.
(a) First of all, we prove the induction hypothesis for k = 1. That is,
∆1x ≤ ∆1z. Suppose, on the contrary, that
∆1x > ∆
1
z ≥ 0. (11)
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From here, we get ∆1x > 0 which means that x
1
1 6= x12. Suppose, w.l.o.g., that
x11 > x
1
2. (12)
Since ∆1x > ∆
1
z and by efficiency, we have that
x11 > z
1
1 and x
1
2 < z
1
2 . (13)
Since ∆1x > ∆
1
z and by Claim 1, there exists j
′ ∈ M \ {1} such that
∆j
′
x < ∆
j′
z . Moreover, since ∆x is ordered in a non-increasing way, we have
that ∆1x ≥ ∆j′x . Now, taking into account (10), since ∆j′x < ∆j′z and ∆1x > ∆1z,
we can deduce that this inequality is strict, i.e. ∆1x > ∆
j′
x .
On the other hand, since ∆j
′
x < ∆
j′
z , we have that x
j′ 6= zj′ . At this point
we consider two cases:
Case 1: xj
′
1 < z
j′
1 and thus, by efficiency, x
j′
2 > z
j′
2 . In this case, define
x̂ ∈ RN×M+ as follows:
x̂11 = x
1
1− , x̂12 = x12 + , x̂j
′
1 = x
j′
1 + , x̂
j′
2 = x
j′
2 −  and x̂ji = xji , else, (14)
where 0 <  < min
{
x11 − z11 , z12 − x12, zj
′
1 − xj
′
1 , x
j′
2 − zj
′
2 ,
x11+x
j′
2 −
(
xj
′
1 +x
1
2
)
2
}
.
In order to check that  exists notice that: in case xj
′
1 ≤ xj
′
2 , since x
1
1 > x
1
2
(see (12)), we have that x11 + x
j′
2 > x
j′
1 + x
1
2; in case x
j′
1 > x
j′
2 , since x
1
1 > x
1
2
(see (12)) and ∆1x > ∆
j′
x , we also obtain that x
1
1 + x
j′
2 > x
j′
1 + x
1
2. Let us
remark that, by definition of , x̂ ∈ D(r, c) and ∑j∈M x̂ji = ∑j∈M xji , for all
i ∈ N. Now, from the definition of x̂ it holds that∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(x̂ji )
2 =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(xji )
2 + 2 · 
(
2 · −
(
x11 + x
j′
2 −
(
xj
′
1 + x
1
2
)))
<
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(xji )
2,
where the inequality follows from  <
x11+x
j′
2 −
(
xj
′
1 +x
1
2
)
2
. Therefore, we reach a
contradiction with the fact that x = ĈEA(r, c) and thus we conclude that
∆1x ≤ ∆1z.
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Case 2: xj
′
1 > z
j′
1 and thus, by efficiency, x
j′
2 < z
j′
2 . Since x
j′
1 > z
j′
1 , x
1
1 > z
1
1
(see (13)) and
∑
j∈M x
j
1 =
∑
j∈M z
j
1, there exists j
′′ ∈ M \ {1, j′} such that
xj
′′
1 < z
j′′
1 . At this point we consider two subcases:
2.1 In case xj
′′
1 ≤ xj
′′
2 and since x
1
1 > x
1
2 (see (12)), we have that x
1
1 + x
j′′
2 >
xj
′′
1 + x
1
2. Thus, we can define the payoff vector x̂ as in (14), but replacing j
′
by j′′, and we reach the same contradiction.
2.2 In case xj
′′
1 > x
j′′
2 , since x
j′′
1 < z
j′′
1 and by efficiency, we obtain that
xj
′′
2 > z
j′′
2 . Hence, we have that z
j′′
1 > x
j′′
1 > x
j′′
2 > z
j′′
2 and thus, ∆
j′′
x < ∆
j′′
z .
Moreover, since we are supposing that ∆x is ordered in a non-increasing way,
we have that ∆1x ≥ ∆j′′x . In fact, taking into account (10), since ∆j′′x < ∆j′′z
and ∆1x > ∆
1
z (see (11)), we can deduce that this inequality is strict, i.e.
∆1x > ∆
j′′
x . Hence, since we are supposing that x
j′′
1 > x
j′′
2 and x
1
1 > x
1
2 (see
(12)), we obtain that x11 + x
j′′
2 > x
j′′
1 + x
1
2. Thus, we can again define the
payoff vector x̂ as in (14), but replacing j′ by j′′, and we reach the same
contradiction.
Therefore, we conclude that ∆1x ≤ ∆1z.
(b) Assume the induction hypothesis holds up to k − 1, for some k ∈
{2, 3, . . . ,m− 1} and suppose that
k−1∑
j=1
∆jx ≤
k−1∑
j=1
∆jz. (15)
Next, we prove that
∑k
j=1 ∆
j
x ≤
∑k
j=1 ∆
j
z. Suppose, on the contrary, that
k∑
j=1
∆jx >
k∑
j=1
∆jz. (16)
Hence, by (15), it holds
∆kx > ∆
k
z ≥ 0, (17)
which implies that ∆kx > 0 and thus, x
k
1 6= xk2. Suppose, w.l.o.g., that
xk1 > x
k
2. (18)
42
Then, since we are supposing that ∆kx > ∆
k
z (see (17)) and by efficiency, we
have that
xk1 > z
k
1 and z
k
2 > x
k
2. (19)
Next, we divide the subset M \ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,m} in four subsets as
follows:
M̂1 =
{
j ∈M \ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,m}| xj1 ≥ zj1 and xj1 > xj2
}
,
M̂2 =
{
j ∈M \ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,m}| xj1 ≥ zj1 and xj1 < xj2
}
,
M̂3 =
{
j ∈M \ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,m}| xj1 < zj1
}
and
M̂4 =
{
j ∈M \ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,m}| xj1 = xj2
}
,
Notice that M̂1∪M̂2∪M̂3∪M̂4 = M \{k+1, k+2, . . . ,m} and M̂k∩M̂k′ = ∅,
for all k 6= k′ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, since the following claim holds.
Claim 2 If xj1 < z
j
1 for some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}, then xj1 > xj2.
The proof of this claim is consigned into Appendix B.
We next show that
∑k
j=1 ∆
j
x <
∑k
j=1 ∆
j
z. To this aim let us denote
18
dj = |xj1 − zj1|, for all j ∈M . Then,
18Notice that, by efficiency, |xj1 − zj1| = |xj2 − zj2|, for all j ∈M .
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k∑
j=1
∆jx =
∑
j∈M̂1
(xj1 − xj2) +
∑
j∈M̂2
(xj2 − xj1) +
∑
j∈M̂3
(xj1 − xj2)
=
∑
j∈M̂1
(
xj1 − dj − (xj2 + dj) + 2 · dj
)
+
∑
j∈M̂2
(
xj2 + d
j − (xj1 − dj)− 2 · dj
)
+
∑
j∈M̂3
(
xj1 + d
j − (xj2 − dj)− 2 · dj
)
=
∑
j∈M̂1
(zj1 − zj2) +
∑
j∈M̂2
(zj2 − zj1)
+
∑
j∈M̂3
(zj1 − zj2) + 2
( ∑
j∈M̂1
dj −
∑
j∈M̂2∪M̂3
dj
)
<
∑
j∈M̂1∪M̂3
(zj1 − zj2) +
∑
j∈M̂2
(zj2 − zj1) ≤
∑
j∈M̂1∪M̂2∪M̂3
∣∣zj1 − zj2∣∣ ≤ k∑
j=1
∆jz,
where the strict inequality follows from the next claim.
Claim 3
∑
j∈M̂1 d
j <
∑
j∈M̂2∪M̂3 d
j.
The proof of this claim is also consigned into Appendix B.
We have reached to a contradiction with the assumption
∑k
j=1 ∆
j
x >∑k
j=1 ∆
j
z (see (16)). Then, we obtain that
∑k
j=1 ∆
j
x ≤
∑k
j=1 ∆
j
z. Taking this
fact into account and by Claim 1, we conclude that
k∑
j=1
∆jx ≤
k∑
j=1
∆jz, for all k ∈M. (20)
Next, we prove that at least one of these inequalities is strict. Let us
suppose, on the contrary, that all of them are equalities, i.e.
∑k
j=1 ∆
k
x =∑k
j=1 ∆
k
z, for all k ∈M , and thus,
∆jx = ∆
j
z, for all j ∈M. (21)
44
Since x 6= z, there exists j∗ ∈M such that xj∗ 6= zj∗ , w.l.o.g.
xj
∗
1 > z
j∗
1 and, by efficiency, x
j∗
2 < z
j∗
2 . (22)
Hence, since ∆j
∗
x = ∆
j∗
z and by efficiency of both allocations, we have that
xj
∗
1 6= xj
∗
2 . Then, we obtain that x
j∗
1 > x
j∗
2 , otherwise, i.e. x
j∗
1 < x
j∗
2 , and,
by (22), we have that zj
∗
2 > x
j∗
2 > x
j∗
1 > z
j∗
1 , which means that ∆
j∗
x < ∆
j∗
z ,
reaching a contradiction with (21).
On the other hand, since xj
∗
1 > z
j∗
1 and
∑
j∈M x
j
1 =
∑
j∈M z
j
1, there exists
j′ ∈M such that
xj
′
1 < z
j′
1 and, by efficiency, x
j′
2 > z
j′
2 . (23)
Hence, since ∆j
′
x = ∆
j′
z and by efficiency of both allocations, x
j′
1 6= xj
′
2 . Then,
we claim that xj
′
1 < x
j′
2 ; otherwise, x
j′
1 > x
j′
2 and, by (23), we would have
that zj
′
1 > x
j′
1 > x
j′
2 > z
j′
2 , which would imply that ∆
j∗
x < ∆
j∗
z , reaching a
contradiction with (21).
At this point we can define a vector x̂ as in (14), but replacing 1 by j∗,
and we reach the same contradiction. Then, there exists at least one strict
inequality in (20).
Finally, since ∆˜x
j
= ∆jx, for all j ∈M , we have that, for all k ∈M ,
k∑
j=1
∆˜x
j
=
k∑
j=1
∆jx ≤
k∑
j=1
∆jz ≤
k∑
j=1
∆˜z
j
,
where the first inequality follows from (20). Then, we conclude that
k∑
j=1
∆˜x
j ≤
k∑
j=1
∆˜z
j
, for all k ∈M,
and, since at least one of these inequalities is strict, xL0z, and the proof is
done.

From this proposition we can state two corollaries.
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Corollary 1 For any two-person CMIA problem (r, c) ∈ MRN×M with
M ∈ M, N ∈ N and |N | = 2, the ĈEA rule multi-issue Lorenz-dominates
in awards any other rule F (ĈEA0mF) satisfying, for all i ∈ N ,∑
j∈M
F ji (r, c) =
∑
j∈M
ĈEA
j
i (r, c).
Corollary 2 The ĈEA rule is multi-issue Lorenz undominated in awards.
By using the consistency properties and the multi-issue Lorenz-domination,
we can characterize the ĈEA rule.
Theorem 1 A rule F on MR is one-issue 0-consistent19, consistent over
agents and multi-issue Lorenz undominated in awards for any two-person
problem if and only if F is the ĈEA rule.
Proof. Since the ĈEA rule is contained in the extended β-egalitarian family
of rules, the ĈEA rule is consistent over agents. Moreover, by Proposition 3 it
is also one-issue 0-consistent, and by Corollary 2 it is Lorenz undominated in
awards for any two-person problem. Next, let us check the uniqueness of the
rule. Let F be a rule satisfying these properties, but suppose on the contrary
that F 6= ĈEA. Then, there exists a CMIA problem (r, c) ∈MRN×M such
that z = F(r, c) 6= ĈEA(r, c) = x. Since both rules are consistent over
agents, there exist two agents i′, i′′ ∈ N such that
z|{i′,i′′} = F
((
rj −∑i∈N\{i′,i′′} zji )j∈M , c|{i′,i′′})
6= ĈEA
((
rj −∑i∈N\{i′,i′′} xji)j∈M , c|{i′,i′′}) = x|{i′,i′′}. (24)
Moreover, since both rules are one-issue 0-consistent, using Proposition 3
and by the implication given by (2), we obtain that∑
j∈M
xji′ =
∑
j∈M
zji′ and
∑
j∈M
xji′′ =
∑
j∈M
zji′′ . (25)
19See page 24 for the definition of one-issue 0-consistency.
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Finally, by (25) and Corollary 1, we know that x|{i′,i′′}0mz|{i′,i′′}, but this
contradicts that F is multi-issue Lorenz undominated in awards for any two-
person problem.

The properties used in Theorem 1 are logically independent, as we see next.
• The rule F ′ that assigns within each issue j ∈M the vector(F ′j1(r, c),F ′j2(r, c), . . . ,F ′jn(r, c)) = CEA(rj, cj),
is consistent over agents and multi-issue Lorenz undominated for any
two-person problem, but it is not one-issue 0-consistent.
• The rule F ′′ defined as
F ′′(r, c) =

arg min
x∈Dα(r,c)
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(
xji
)2
if |N | = 2
arg min
x∈Dα(r,c)
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(
xji − cji
)2
if |N | 6= 2
,
where Dα(r, c) = arg min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N(
∑
j∈M x
j
i )
2, is multi-issue Lorenz un-
dominated for any two-person problem and one-issue 0-consistent, but
it does not satisfy consistency over agents.
• The rule F ′′′ defined as
F ′′′(r, c) = arg min
x∈Dα(r,c)
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(
xji − cji
)2
,
where Dα(r, c) = arg min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N(
∑
j∈M x
j
i )
2, is one-issue 0-consistent
and consistent over agents, but it is multi-issue Lorenz-dominated by
the ĈEA rule for any two-person problem.
Analogously to the single-issue case, we can define multi-issue Lorenz-
domination from a reference point a. To this aim we define the vector of net
payoff differences from a reference point a.
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Definition 18 Let x ∈ RN×M be a multi-issue payoff vector and a ∈ RN×M
be a reference point. The vector of net payoff differences of x from a, ∆ax ∈
RM+ , is defined as follows:
∆ax =
(
max
i∈N
{xji − aji} −min
i∈N
{xji − aji}
)
j∈M
∈ RM+ .
Moreover, we denote by ∆˜ax the vector obtained from ∆
a
x by rearranging its
coordinates in a decreasing order (from large to small).
Following the same line as before, we use the vector of net payoff differ-
ences to evaluate when a payoff vector is more egalitarian across issues from
a reference point a than any other payoff vector with the same vector of total
payoffs.
Definition 19 Given a problem (r, c) ∈ MRN×M , a reference point a ∈
RN×M and two payoff vectors x, z ∈ D(r, c) such that ∑j∈M zji = ∑j∈M xji ,
for all i ∈ N , we say that x multi-issue Lorenz-dominates z from a (xamz)
if
k∑
j=1
∆˜ax
j ≤
k∑
j=1
∆˜az
j
, for all k ∈M,
with at least one strict inequality.20
We also apply the concept of multi-issue Lorenz-domination to rules.
Definition 20 Given a multi-issue reference system α and two rules F and
F̂ , we say that a rule F multi-issue Lorenz-dominates a rule F̂ from the
multi-issue reference system α
(FαmF̂), if, for all N ∈ N , all M ∈M and
any (r, c) ∈MRN×M ,
F(r, c)amF̂(r, c),
where a = MNα(c).
20Notice that, if a = (0, 0, . . . , 0), then Êa = ĈEA and Definition 16 arises from this
definition.
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The next proposition and theorem mimic the results obtained for the
ĈEA rule to other multi-issue reference systems other than α = 0.
Proposition 5 Let (r, c) ∈MRN×M with |N | = 2 and x = Êα(r, c), then
xamz, for all z ∈ D(r, c) with
∑
j∈M
zji =
∑
j∈M
xji , for all i ∈ N,
where a = MNα(c).
The last result of this section characterizes the whole family of the ex-
tended α-egalitarian rules with a consistent multi-issue reference system.
Theorem 2 For an arbitrary consistent multi-issue reference system α, a
rule F on MR is consistent over agents, one-issue α-consistent and multi-
issue Lorenz undominated from α for any two-person problem if and only if
F is the Êα rule.
The proofs of Proposition 5 and Theorem 2 can be obtained following the
same guidelines of the proof of Proposition 4 and Theorem 1, respectively.
4 Conclusions
Section 2 introduces the idea of reinterpreting a single-issue rationing rule as
a distance minimization program from a reference point. In the same section,
we analyse a family of rules which have as reference point a proportion of
the claims. This is the family of β-egalitarian rules which is a generalization
of the RT rule and coincides with the RTAL family (van den Brink et al.,
2013; Thomson, 2008). As it is known, the RT rule is the “reverse” of the T
rule (see footnote 7 on page 16). Similarly, the “reverse” of the RTAL family
is the TAL ≡ {T θ}
θ∈[0,1] family of rules (Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2006;
Thomson, 2008) which is a generalization of the T rule. Given θ ∈ [0, 1], the
corresponding T θ rule can be explained from the perspective of the distance
minimization by a combination of two β-egalitarian rules as follows:
T θ(r, c) = E0(min {r, θ · C} , θ · c)+ E1(max {0, r − θ · C} , (1− θ) · c).
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For further research, we aim to extend to the CMIA framework the TAL
family of rules.
The Eα rule, when the reference system α is constant and independent
of the claims21 is directly related to the generalized equal awards (GEA)
rule (see Chapter 2). Recall that the GEA rule is a generalization of the
CEA rule for rationing problems with ex-ante conditions
(
(r, c, δ) ∈ RCN)
in which agents, in contrast to the single-issue rationing problems, are not
only identified by their respective claims, but also by some exogenous ex-
ante conditions (initial stock of resource or net worth of agents), other than
claims. The GEA rule follows an egalitarian principle from minus the vector
of ex-ante conditions (−δ ∈ RN). Thus, if we take minus the vector of ex-
ante conditions as reference point, i.e. Nα(c) = −δ, then the α-egalitarian
rule Eα is equivalent to the GEA rule (see Proposition 13 in Appendix A).
On the other hand, this chapter can also shed some light in the search of
a dynamic intertemporal rationing problem (when periods are represented by
issues). Indeed, in the conclusions of Chapter 2 we state that “our model can
be applied to allocate resources in other contexts, for instance, those in which
the same group of agents faces a sequence of rationing problems at different
periods of time. The distribution in the current period is influenced by the
amount received in previous periods, which can be considered as an ex-ante
condition for the current rationing problem.” In this way, the reference point
in each period (issue) would not be constant and might be determined by the
previous allocations (see the interpretation of one-issue α-consistent rules on
page 32).
In future research, it might be possible to characterize the extended β-
egalitarian family of rules, by using adapted properties of the ones that char-
acterize the RTAL family of rules (Ar´ın et al., 2016; van den Brink et al.,
2013).
21Let us recall that a reference system α is constant and independent of the claims if
Nαi(c) = pi ∈ R, for all i ∈ N and all N ∈ N .
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5 Appendix A
Proposition 6 For all N ∈ N and all (r, c) ∈ RN it holds that
{CEA(r, c)} = arg min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
xi
2.
Proof. First of all, notice that x = CEA(r, c) if and only if, for all i 6= j ∈ N ,
if xi < xj, then xi = ci. (26)
Let x∗ be the unique solution of the minimization program min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N xi
2
and suppose on the contrary that x∗ 6= CEA(r, c). By (26) there exist at
least two agents i, j ∈ N, such that x∗i < x∗j , but x∗i < ci. Next, define
x′ ∈ RN+ as follows: x′i = x∗i + , x′j = x∗j −  and x′k = x∗k else, where
0 <  < min{ci − x∗i , x∗j − x∗i }. By definition of , it follows x′ ∈ D(r, c).
Moreover, notice that∑
k∈N x
′
k
2 =
∑
k∈N\{i,j} x
∗
k
2 + (x∗i + )
2 + (x∗j − )2
=
∑
k∈N x
∗
k
2 + 2
(
− (x∗j − x∗i )
)
<
∑
k∈N x
∗
k
2,
where the inequality follows from  < x∗j − x∗i . Therefore, we reach a con-
tradiction with the fact that {x∗} = arg min∑i∈N x2i , and thus, we conclude
that x∗ = CEA(r, c).

Proposition 7 For all N ∈ N and all (r, c) ∈ RN it holds that
{CEL(r, c)} = arg min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N
(xi − ci)2.
Proof. First of all, notice that x = CEL(r, c) if and only if, for all i 6= j ∈ N ,
if xi > 0 and xj > 0, then ci − xi = cj − xj. (27)
Let x∗ be the unique solution of the minimization program min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N(xi−
ci)
2. Suppose, on the contrary, that x∗ 6= CEL(r, c). By (27) there exist
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at least two agents i, j ∈ N, such that x∗i > 0 and x∗j > 0, but (w.l.o.g.)
ci − x∗i > cj − x∗j . Next, define x′ ∈ RN+ as follows: x′i = x∗i + , x′j = x∗j − 
and x′k = x
∗
k else, where 0 <  < min{ci − x∗i , x∗j , ci − x∗i − (cj − x∗j)}. By
definition of , we have x′ ∈ D(r, c). The remaining of the proof follows the
same guidelines of the proof of Proposition 6.

Definition 21 A rationing rule F satisfies resource monotonicity if for all
N ∈ N and all (r, c) ∈ RN with ∑i∈N ci ≥ r′ ≥ r it holds
F (r′, c) ≥ F (r, c).
Proposition 8 For an arbitrary reference system α, the corresponding Eα
rule satisfies resource monotonicity.
Proof. Let α be a reference system, (r, c) ∈ RN be a single-issue rationing
problem and x = Eα(r, c). Then, take r′ such that
∑
i∈N ci ≥ r′ ≥ r and let
x′ = Eα(r′, c). If r′ = r, the result is straightforward. If r′ > r, suppose on
the contrary that there exists i ∈ N such that x′i < xi. Then, by efficiency,
i.e.
∑
k∈N x
′
k = r
′ > r =
∑
k∈N xk, there exists j ∈ N \{i} such that x′j > xj.
Next, we claim that
xj − aj ≥ xi − ai. (28)
where a = Nα(c). Suppose on the contrary that xj − aj < xi − ai and
define xˇ ∈ RN as follows: xˇi = xi − 1, xˇj = xj + 1, and xˇk = xk else, where
0 < 1 < min{xi, cj−xj, xi−ai−(xj−aj)}. Let us remark that, by definition
of 1, xˇ ∈ D(r, c). Notice that∑
k∈N
(xˇk − ak)2 =
∑
k∈N\{i,j}
(xk − ak)2 + (xi − 1 − ai)2 + (xj + 1 − aj)2
=
∑
k∈N
(xk − ak)2 + 21
(
1 −
(
xi − ai − (xj − aj)
))
<
∑
k∈N
(xk − ak)2,
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where the inequality follows from 1 < xi − ai − (xj − aj). Therefore, we
reach a contradiction with x = Eα(r, c), and thus, (28) holds.
Taking into account (28), we next prove that
x′j − aj > x′i − ai (29)
Indeed, since x′j > xj, xi > x
′
i and (28), we have that
x′j − aj > xj − aj ≥ xi − ai > x′i − ai,
and thus, (29) holds. Finally, let us define x̂ ∈ RN as follows: x̂i = x′i + 2,
x̂j = x
′
j − 2 and x̂k = x′k else, where 0 < 2 < min{x′j − xj, ci − x′i, x′j − aj −
(x′i − ai)}. Notice that, by (29), 2 is well-defined. Let us remark that, by
definition of 2, x̂ ∈ D(r′, c). However, notice that∑
k∈N
(x̂k − ak)2 =
∑
k∈N\{i,j}
(x′k − ak)2 + (x′i + 2 − ai)2 + (x′j − 2 − aj)2
=
∑
k∈N
(x′k − ak)2 + 22
(
2 −
(
x′j − aj − (x′i − ai)
))
<
∑
k∈N
(x′k − ak)2,
where the inequality follows from 2 < x
′
j−aj−(x′i−ai). Therefore, we reach
a contradiction with the fact that x′ = Eα(r′, c). We conclude that x′i ≥ xi,
for all i ∈ N and Eα(r′, c) ≥ Eα(r, c).

Definition 22 A rationing rule F satisfies claims monotonicity if for all
N ∈ N , all (r, c) ∈ RN and all (r, c′) ∈ RN such that c 6= c′ with ci > c′i and
ck = c
′
k, for all k ∈ N \ {i}, it holds
Fi(r, c
′) ≥ Fi(r, c).
Proposition 9 For any arbitrary constant and independent of the claims
reference system α, the corresponding Eα rule satisfies claims monotonicity.
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Proof. Let α be a constant and independent of the claims reference system.
Then, take two claims vectors c, c′ ∈ RN+ such that c′i > ci, for some i ∈ N ,
c′k = ck, for all k ∈ N \ {i} and take r ≤
∑
k∈N ck ≤
∑
k∈N c
′
k. Then,
denote x = Eα(r, c) and x′ = Eα(r, c′) and suppose on the contrary that
x′i < xi. Since x
′ ∈ D(r, c) and x = Eα(r, c), we have that ∑k∈N(xk −
pk)
2 <
∑
k∈N(x
′
k − pk)2, reaching a contradiction with x′ = Eα(r, c′), since
x ∈ D(r, c′). Therefore, we conclude that x′i ≥ xi.

Definition 23 A rationing rule F is consistent if for all (r, c) ∈ RN and all
T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, it holds
F (r, c)|T = F
(
r −
∑
i∈N\T
Fi(r, c), c|T
)
.
Definition 24 A reference system α is consistent if, for all T,N ∈ N with
T ⊆ N we have Nαi(z)|T = Tαi(z|T ), for all z ∈ RN and all i ∈ T .
Proposition 10 For an arbitrary consistent reference system α, the corre-
sponding Eα rule is also consistent.
Proof. Let (r, c) ∈ RN be a rationing problem and denote x∗ = Eα(r, c),
where α is an arbitrary consistent reference system with Nα(c) = a ∈ RN .
Then, by definition, we have that∑
i∈N
(x∗i − ai)2 <
∑
i∈N
(xi − ai)2, (30)
for all x ∈ D(r, c) such that x 6= x∗.
Let T ⊆ N be an arbitrary sub-coalition and let us suppose on the con-
trary that
x∗|T 6= Eα
(
r −
∑
i∈N\T
Eαi (r, c), c|T
)
= y.
Now, since α is consistent, taking (30) into account and since Eα assigns
a unique solution, we have that
∑
i∈T (yi − ai)2 <
∑
i∈T (x
∗
i − ai)2. However,
54
(y;x∗|N\T ) ∈ D(r, c) and thus∑
i∈T
(yi − ai)2 +
∑
i∈N\T
(x∗i − ai)2 <
∑
i∈N
(x∗i − ai)2,
which contradicts x∗ = Eα(r, c). Therefore, we conclude that
x∗|T = E
α
(
r −
∑
i∈N\T
x∗i , c|T
)
.

Definition 25 A rationing rule F satisfies path-independence if for all N ∈
N , all (r, c) ∈ RN and all r′ > 0 such that ∑i∈N ci ≥ r′ ≥ r it holds
F (r, c) = F (r, F (r′, c)).
Proposition 11 For an arbitrary reference system α, the corresponding Eα
rule satisfies path-independence.
Proof. Let α be a reference system, (r, c) ∈ RN be a single-issue rationing
problem and x = Eα(r, c). Moreover, take r′ such that
∑
i∈N ci ≥ r′ ≥ r and
write x′ = Eα(r′, c) and x̂ = Eα(r, x′). If r′ = r, the result is straightforward.
If r′ > r, since Eα rule satisfies resource monotonicity (Proposition 8), we
have that xi ≤ x′i ≤ ci and x̂i ≤ x′i ≤ ci, for all i ∈ N . Hence, x̂ ∈ D(r, c)
which implies that, since x = Eα(r, c),∑
k∈N
(xk − ak)2 <
∑
k∈N
(x̂k − ak)2, (31)
where a = Nα(c). However, we have that x ∈ D(r, x′) which implies that∑
k∈N(x̂k−ak)2 <
∑
k∈N(xk−ak)2 since x̂ = Eα(r, x′), reaching a contradic-
tion with (31). Therefore, we conclude that Eα satisfies path-independence.

Definition 26 A rationing rule F satisfies equal treatment of equals if, for
all N ∈ N and all (r, c) ∈ RN , it holds
if ci = cj, then Fi(r, c) = Fj(r, c).
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Proposition 12 For an arbitrary β ∈ [0, 1], the corresponding Eβ rule sat-
isfies equal treatment of equals.
Proof. Let (r, c) ∈ RN be a rationing problem and denote x = Eβ(r, c).
Suppose on the contrary that there exist i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, such that ci = cj,
but (w.l.o.g.) xi > xj. Then, define x
′ ∈ RN+ as follows: x′i = xi−, x′j = xj+
and x′k = xk else, where 0 <  < min{xi − xj, cj − xj}. By definition of , we
have x′ ∈ D(r, c). However, notice that∑
k∈N
(x′k − β · ck)2 =
∑
k∈N\{i,j}
(xk − β · ck)2 + (xi − − β · ci)2
+ (xj + − β · cj)2 =
∑
k∈N
(xk − β · ck)2 + 2
(
− (xi − xj)
)
<
∑
k∈N
(xk − β · ck)2,
where the inequality follows from  < xi − xj. Therefore, we reach a contra-
diction with the fact that x = Eβ(r, c) and we conclude xi = xj.

Proposition 13 Let α be a reference system and (r, c, δ) ∈ RCN be a ra-
tioning problem with ex-ante conditions. Then,
if Nα(c) = −δ, then GEA(r, c, δ) = Eα(r, c).
Proof. Let (r, c, δ) ∈ RCN with N ∈ N . First of all, recall22 that z∗ =
GEA(r, c, δ) if and only if
for all i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, if z∗i +δi < z∗j +δj, then either z∗j = 0, or z∗i = ci.
(32)
Let x∗ be the solution of the minimization program min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N (xi + δi)
2
and suppose on the contrary that x∗ 6= z∗ = GEA(r, c, δ). By (32) there exist
at least two agents i, j ∈ N, such that x∗i + δi < x∗j + δj, but x∗i < ci and
22See the first proposition of Chapter 2.
56
x∗j > 0. Then, define x
′ ∈ RN+ as follows: x′i = x∗i + , x′j = x∗j−  and x′k = x∗k
else, where 0 <  < min{ci − x∗i , x∗j , x∗j + δj − (x∗i + δi)}. Then, notice that∑
k∈N (x
′
k + δk)
2 =
∑
k∈N\{i,j} (x
∗
k + δk)
2 + (x∗i + + δi)
2 + (x∗j − + δj)2
=
∑
k∈N (x
∗
k + δk)
2 + 2
(
− (x∗j + δj − (x∗i + δi))
)
<
∑
k∈N (x
∗
k + δk)
2,
where the inequality follows from  < x∗j + δj− (x∗i + δi). Therefore, we reach
a contradiction with the fact that {x∗} = arg min
x∈D(r,c)
∑
i∈N (xi + δi)
2, and thus,
we conclude that Eα(r, c) = x∗ = z∗ = GEA(r, c, δ).

6 Appendix B
Proof of Claim 1 Let us recall that we are supposing that N = {1, 2} and
x = ĈEA(r, c). First, given two feasible payoffs y,y′ ∈ D(r, c), let us divide
the set of issues M in three subsets
M1(y,y
′) = {j ∈M |yj1 > y′j1},
M2(y,y
′) = {j ∈M |yj2 > y′j2} and
M3(y,y
′) = M \M1(y,y′) ∪M2(y,y′).
Let z ∈ D(r, c) be a payoff vector such that∑j∈M ∆jz ≤∑j∈M ∆jy, for all
y ∈ D(r, c) with ∑j∈M yji = ∑j∈M zji = ∑j∈M xji , for all i ∈ N , but suppose
on the contrary that
∑
j∈M ∆
j
z <
∑
j∈M ∆
j
x, which implies that x 6= z. Since
x 6= z and by efficiency (xj1 + xj2 = rj = zj1 + zj2, for all j ∈M), we have that
M1(x, z) 6= ∅ and M2(x, z) 6= ∅. (33)
Then, we consider two cases:
Case 1: There exist j′ ∈M1(x, z) and j′′ ∈M2(x, z) such that xj′1 > xj
′
2 and
xj
′′
1 < x
j′′
2 . Then, define x̂ ∈ RN×M+ as follows: x̂j
′
1 = x
j′
1 − , x̂j
′
2 = x
j′
2 + ,
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x̂j
′′
1 = x
j′′
1 + , x̂
j′′
2 = x
j′′
2 −  and x̂ji = xji else, where
0 <  < min
{
xj
′
1 − zj
′
1 , z
j′
2 − xj
′
2 , z
j′′
1 − xj
′′
1 , x
j′′
2 − zj
′′
2 ,
xj
′
1 + x
j′′
2 −
(
xj
′′
1 + x
j′
2
)
2
}
Let us remark that  is well-defined: first, since j′ ∈ M1(x, z), we have
that xj
′
1 > z
j′
1 and thus, by efficiency, x
j′
2 < z
j′
2 ; second, since j
′′ ∈ M2(x, z),
we have that xj
′′
2 > z
j′′
2 and thus, by efficiency x
j′′
1 < z
j′′
1 ; finally, since
xj
′
1 > x
j′
2 and x
j′′
2 > x
j′′
1 , we have that x
j′
1 + x
j′′
2 > x
j′′
1 + x
j′
2 . Notice that, by
definition of , x̂ ∈ D(r, c) with ∑j∈M x̂ji = ∑j∈M xji , for all i ∈ N . Now,
observe that∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(x̂ji )
2 =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(xji )
2 + 2 · 
(
2 · −
(
xj
′
1 + x
j′′
2 −
(
xj
′′
1 + x
j′
2
)))
<
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(xji )
2,
where the inequality follows from  <
xj
′
1 +x
j′′
2 −
(
xj
′′
1 +x
j′
2
)
2
. However, this con-
tradicts the fact that x = ĈEA(r, c).
Case 2: For all j′ ∈ M1(x, z) and all j′′ ∈ M2(x, z), either xj′1 ≤ xj
′
2 , or
xj
′′
1 ≥ xj
′′
2 . Then, we define recursively a sequence of feasible payoff vectors
0x, 1x, 2x, . . . , kx, . . . , Kx,
following the next procedure.
For k = 0, set 0x = x.
For k = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
If k−1x = z. Stop.
If k−1x 6= z, take j′ ∈ M1(k−1x, z) such that |k−1xj
′
1 −
zj
′
1 | ≤ |k−1xj1 − zj1|, for all j ∈ M1(k−1x, z) and j′′ ∈ M2(k−1x, z) such
that23 |k−1xj′′1 − zj
′′
1 | ≤ |k−1xj1 − zj1|, for all j ∈ M2(k−1x, z). Notice that,
23 Notice that, by efficiency, |k−1xj1 − zj1| = |k−1x
j
2 − zj2|, for all j ∈M .
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M1(
k−1x, z) 6= ∅ and M2(k−1x, z) 6= ∅, since k−1x 6= z and k−1x ∈ D(r, c),
and thus, k−1x is efficient (k−1xj1 +
k−1xj2 = r
j = zj1 + z
j
2, for all j ∈ M).
Then,
• in case |k−1xj′1 − zj
′
1 | ≤ |k−1xj
′′
1 − zj
′′
1 |, define kx ∈ RN×M as follows:23
kxj
′
1 =
k−1x
j′
1 − |k−1xj
′
1 − zj
′
1 | = zj
′
1 ,
kx
j′
2 =
k−1x
j′
2 + |k−1xj
′
1 − zj
′
1 | = zj
′
2 ,
kxj
′′
1 =
k−1x
j′′
1 + |k−1xj
′
1 − zj
′
1 |, (34)
kxj
′′
2 =
k−1x
j′′
2 − |k−1xj
′
1 − zj
′
1 | and
kxji =
k−1x
j
i , else;
• in case |k−1xj′1 − zj
′
1 | > |k−1xj
′′
1 − zj
′′
1 |, define kx ∈ RN×M as follows:
kxj
′
1 =
k−1x
j′
1 − |k−1xj
′′
1 − zj
′′
1 |,
kxj
′
2 =
k−1x
j′
2 + |k−1xj
′′
1 − zj
′′
1 |,
kxj
′′
1 =
k−1x
j′′
1 + |k−1xj
′′
1 − zj
′′
1 | = zj
′′
1 , (35)
kxj
′′
2 =
k−1x
j′′
2 − |k−1xj
′′
1 − zj
′′
1 | = zj
′′
2
and kxji =
k−1x
j
i , else.
Notice that, kx ∈ D(r, c) and ∑j∈M kxji = ∑j∈M xji , for all i ∈ N , and go to
the next step.
Observe that, the procedure is well-defined, since, either, M1(
k−1x, z) !
M1(
kx, z) if case (34) holds, or M2(
k−1x, z) ! M2(kx, z) if case (35) holds.
Note that, the procedure stops at stage K ≤ m− 1 when Kx = z, and thus,
M1(
Kx, z) = ∅ and M2(Kx, z) = ∅.
Now, it can be proved that
Subclaim 3.1.1
∑
j∈M
|k−1xj1− k−1xj2| ≤
∑
j∈M
|kxj1− kxj2| for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
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The proof of this result can be found just below. Finally, since Kx = z
and 0x = x, and by Subclaim 3.1.1, we conclude that
∑
j∈M ∆
j
x ≤
∑
j∈M ∆
j
z
reaching a contradiction with the initial hypothesis, and we are done.

Proof of Subclaim 3.1.1 First of all, let us recall that we are under hy-
pothesis of Case 2 of Claim 1. That is,
for all j′ ∈M1(x, z) and all j′′ ∈M2(x, z),
either xj
′
1 ≤ xj
′
2 , or x
j′′
1 ≥ xj
′′
2 .
(36)
Let k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, and let j′ ∈ M1(k−1x, z) and j′′ ∈ M2(k−1x, z) be
the agents selected in the step k of the recursive definition of kx. Then, we
consider two cases:
Case a: |k−1xj′1 −zj
′
1 | ≤ |k−1xj
′′
1 −zj
′′
1 | and thus kx is defined as in (34). First,
denote d = |k−1xj′1 − zj
′
1 | and consider three subcases:
Subcase a.1: k−1xj
′
1 ≤ k−1xj
′
2 and
k−1xj
′′
1 <
k−1xj
′′
2 .
Then, by (34), we have that∑
j∈M
|k−1xj1 − k−1xj2| =
∑
j∈M\{j′,j′′}
|kxj1 − kxj2|+ (k−1xj
′
2 − k−1xj
′
1 )
+ (k−1x
j′′
2 − k−1xj
′′
1 ) =
∑
j∈M\{j′,j′′}
|kxj1 − kxj2|+
(
k−1x
j′
2 + d− (k−1xj
′
1 − d)
)
+
(
k−1x
j′′
2 − d− (k−1xj
′′
1 + d)
)
=
∑
j∈M\{j′,j′′}
|kxj1 − kxj2|+ (kxj
′
2 − kxj
′
1 )
+ (kx
j′′
2 − kxj
′′
1 ) ≤
∑
j∈M
|kxj1 − kxj2|
and we are done.
Subcase a.2: k−1xj
′
1 ≤ k−1xj
′
2 and
k−1xj
′′
1 ≥ k−1xj
′′
2 .
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Then, by (34) and since d > 0, we obtain that∑
j∈M
|k−1xj1 − k−1xj2| =
∑
j∈M\{j′,j′′}
|kxj1 − kxj2|+ (k−1xj
′
2 − k−1xj
′
1 )
+ (k−1x
j′′
1 − k−1xj
′′
2 ) <
∑
j∈M\{j′,j′′}
|kxj1 − kxj2|+
(
k−1x
j′
2 + d− (k−1xj
′
1 − d)
)
+
(
k−1x
j′′
1 + d− (k−1xj
′′
2 − d)
)
=
∑
j∈M\{j′,j′′}
|kxj1 − kxj2|+ (kxj
′
2 − kxj
′
1 )
+ (kx
j′′
1 − kxj
′′
2 ) ≤
∑
j∈M
|kxj1 − kxj2|
and we are done.
Subcase a.3: k−1xj
′
1 >
k−1xj
′
2 and
k−1xj
′′
1 ≥ k−1xj
′′
2 . Then, by (34), it holds
that∑
j∈M
|k−1xj1 − k−1xj2| =
∑
j∈M\{j′,j′′}
|kxj1 − kxj2|+ (k−1xj
′
1 − k−1xj
′
2 )
+ (k−1x
j′′
1 − k−1xj
′′
2 ) =
∑
j∈M\{j′,j′′}
|kxj1 − kxj2|+
(
k−1x
j′
1 − d− (k−1xj
′
2 + d)
)
+
(
k−1x
j′′
1 + d− (k−1xj
′′
2 − d)
)
=
∑
j∈M\{j′,j′′}
|kxj1 − kxj2|+ (kxj
′
1 − kxj
′
2 )
+ (kx
j′′
1 − kxj
′′
2 ) ≤
∑
j∈M
|kxj1 − kxj2|.
and we are done.
Notice that, the remaining combination,
k−1x
j′
1 >
k−1x
j′
2 and
k−1x
j′′
1 <
k−1x
j′′
2 , (37)
is not possible. To check it, let us remark that if k = 1 then kx = 0x = x
which contradicts (36). On the other hand, if k ≥ 2, then, by (34), we obtain
that
zj
′
1 =
kx
j′
1 <
k−1xj
′
1 ≤ k−2xj
′
1 ≤ . . . ≤ 0xj
′
1 = x
j′
1 and
zj
′
2 =
kx
j′
2 >
k−1xj
′
2 ≥ k−2xj
′
2 ≥ . . . ≥ 0xj
′
2 = x
j′
2 ,
(38)
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and
zj
′′
1 ≥ kxj
′′
1 >
k−1xj
′′
1 ≥ k−2xj
′′
1 ≥ . . . ≥ 0xj
′′
1 = x
j′′
1 and
zj
′′
2 ≤ kxj
′′
2 <
k−1xj
′′
2 ≤ k−2xj
′′
2 ≤ . . . ≤ 0xj
′′
2 = x
j′′
2 .
(39)
Therefore, by (37) and (38) we obtain that xj
′
1 > x
j′
2 and, by (37) and (39)
we have that xj
′′
1 < x
j′′
2 . Since j
′ ∈ M1(x, z) and j′′ ∈ M2(x, z) we reach a
contradiction with (36). We conclude that (37) is not possible.
Case b: |k−1xj′1 − zj
′
1 | > |k−1xj
′′
1 − zj
′′
1 | and thus kx is defined as in (35).
Analogously, this case is solved in the same way than Case a, but taking
d = |k−1xj′′1 − zj
′′
1 |. And we are done.

Proof of Claim 2 Suppose on the contrary that there exists j′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k−
1} such that xj′1 < zj
′
1 , but x
j′
1 ≤ xj
′
2 . Hence, by (18), it holds that x
k
1 + x
j′
2 >
xj
′
1 + x
k
2 and, by (19), we can define the payoff vector x̂ as in (14), but re-
placing 1 by k, and we reach the same contradiction. Therefore, we conclude
that xj
′
1 > x
j′
2 and we are done.

Proof of Claim 3 We start the proof by analysing two subclaims:
Subclaim 3.3.1 xj1 ≥ zj1, for all j ∈ {k, k + 1, . . . ,m}.
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Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there exists j′ ∈ {k, k+1, . . . ,m}
such that xj
′
1 < z
j′
1 . In case x
j′
1 ≤ xj
′
2 , since x
k
1 > x
k
2 (see (18)), it holds
that xk1 +x
j′
2 > x
j′
1 +x
k
2 and, by (19), we can define the payoff vector x̂
as in (14), but replacing 1 by k, and we reach the same contradiction.
In the remaining case xj
′
1 > x
j′
2 , since x
j′
1 < z
j′
1 and by efficiency, we
obtain that xj
′
2 > z
j′
2 . Hence, we have that z
j′
1 > x
j′
1 > x
j′
2 > z
j′
2 and
thus, ∆j
′
x < ∆
j′
z . Moreover, since j
′ > k and since we are supposing
that ∆x is ordered in a non-increasing way, we have that ∆
k
x ≥ ∆j′x .
Furthermore, taking into account (10), since ∆j
′
x < ∆
j′
z and ∆
k
x > ∆
k
z
(see (17)), we can deduce that this inequality is strict, i.e. ∆kx > ∆
j′
x .
Finally, since we are supposing that xj
′
1 > x
j′
2 and x
k
1 > x
k
2 (see (18)),
we obtain that xk1+x
j′
2 > x
j′
1 +x
k
2 and we can define the payoff vector x̂
as in (14), but replacing 1 by k, and we reach the same contradiction.
Thus, the proof of the subclaim is done.
♦
Subclaim 3.3.2 There exists j′ ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,m} such that dj′ > 0.
Proof. Since we are supposing that
∑k
j=1 ∆
j
x >
∑k
j=1 ∆
j
z (see (16))
and by Claim 1, there exists j′ ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,m} such that
∆j
′
x < ∆
j′
z . This implies that x
j′ 6= zj′ which means that dj′ > 0.
♦
Next, taking into account that x 6= z, let us define
S1 = {j ∈M |xj1 < zj1} and
S2 = {j ∈M |xj1 ≥ zj1},
as a partition of M .
Since
∑
j∈M x
j
1 =
∑
j∈M z
j
1, it follows that∑
j∈S1
dj =
∑
j∈S2
dj. (40)
Next, we show that S2 = M \ M̂3 and thus, S1 = M̂3. Claim 2 implies
that xj1 ≥ zj1, for all j ∈ M̂4. Hence, by Subclaim 3.3.1, and by the definitions
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of M̂1 and M̂2, it holds that x
j
1 ≥ zj1, for all j ∈ M \ M̂3 which means that
S2 = M \ M̂3. Hence, by (40),∑
j∈M̂3
dj =
∑
j∈M\M̂3
dj.
Finally, we conclude that∑
j∈M̂2∪M̂3
dj ≥
∑
j∈M̂3
dj =
∑
j∈M̂1∪M̂2∪M̂4
dj +
∑
j∈M\{1,2,...,k}
dj
>
∑
j∈M̂1∪M̂2∪M̂4
dj ≥
∑
j∈M̂1
dj,
where the strict inequality follows from Subclaim 3.3.2 and thus, the proof
of the claim is done.

64
References
[1] Ar´ın, J., & Benito-Ostolaza, J., 2012. Claims problems: the Lorenz
and the least square criteria. Working Paper Dto. Economı´a UPNA,
DT1002. Mimeo.
[2] Ar´ın, J., Benito-Ostolaza, J., & In˜arra, E., 2016. The RTAL-family of
rules for bankruptcy problems: a characterization. Mimeo.
[3] Aumann, R., & Maschler, M., 1985. Game theoretic analysis of a
bankruptcy problem from the Talmud. J. Econ. Theory 36, 195–213.
[4] Bergantin˜os, G., Lorenzo, L., & Lorenzo-Freire, S., 2010a. A charac-
terization of the proportional rule in multi-issue allocation situations.
Oper. Res. Lett. 38, 17–19.
[5] Bergantin˜os, G., Lorenzo, L., & Lorenzo-Freire, S., 2010b. Mixed
rules in multi-issue allocation situations. Uvigo Working Papers.
http://rgea.webs.uvigo.es/workingpapers/rgea409.pdf
[6] Bergantin˜os, G., Lorenzo, L., & Lorenzo-Freire, S., 2011. New charac-
terizations of the constrained equal awards rule in multi-issue allocation
problems. Math. Methods Oper. Res. 74, 311–325.
[7] Borm, P., Carpente, L., Casas-Me´ndez, B., & Hendrickx, R., 2005. The
constrained equal awards rule for bankruptcy problems with a priori
unions. Ann. Oper. Res. 137, 211–227.
[8] Borrell, J., 1989. Me´todos matema´ticos para la economı´a. Ediciones
Pira´mide, Madrid.
[9] van den Brink, R., Funaki, Y., & van der Laan, G., 2013. Charac-
terization of the reverse Talmud bankruptcy rules by exemption and
exclusion properties. European J. Oper. Res. 228, 413–417.
65
[10] Calleja, P., Borm, P., & Hendrickx, R., 2005. Multi-allocation situa-
tions. European J. Oper. Res. 164, 730–747.
[11] Chun, Y., Schummer, J., & Thomson, W., 2001. Constrained egalitari-
anism: a new solution to bankruptcy problems. Seoul J. Economics 14,
269–297.
[12] Chun, Y., & Thomson, W., 1992. Bargaining problems with claims.
Math. Social Sci. 24, 19–33.
[13] Gonza´lez-Alco´n, C., Borm, P., & Hendrickx, R., 2007. A composite run-
to-the-bank rule for multi-allocation situations. Math. Methods Oper.
Res. 65, 339–352.
[14] Hinojosa, M.A., & Ma´rmol, A.M., 2014. Multi-commodity rationing
problems with maxmin payoffs. Math. Meth. Oper. Res. 79, 353–370.
[15] Hinojosa, M.A., Ma´rmol, A.M., & Sa´nchez, F., 2012. A consistent
Talmudic rule for division problems with multiple references. TOP 20,
661–678.
[16] Hinojosa, M.A., Ma´rmol, A.M., & Sa´nchez, F., 2014. Leximin rules for
bankruptcy problems under uncertainty. Int. J. Syst. Sci., 45, 20–28.
[17] Ju, B.-G., Miyagawa, E., & Sakai, T., 2007. Non-manipulable division
rules in claims problems and generalizations. J. Econom. Theory 132,
1–26.
[18] Kasajima, Y., & Velez, R., 2011. Reflecting inequality of claims in gains
and losses. Econ. Theory 46, 283–295.
[19] Lorenzo-Freire, S., Alsonso-Meijide, J., Casas-Me´ndez, B., & Hen-
drickx, R., 2007. Balanced contributions for TU games with awards
and applications. European J. Oper. Res. 182, 958–964.
66
[20] Lorenzo-Freire, S., Casas-Me´ndez, B., & Hendrickx, R., 2010. The two-
stage constrained equal awards and losses rules for multi-issue alloca-
tion situations. TOP 18, 465–480.
[21] Moreno-Ternero, J., 2009. The proportional rule for multi-issue
bankruptcy problems. Econ. Bull. 29, 474–481.
[22] Moreno-Ternero, J., & Villar, A., 2006. The TAL-family of rules for
bankruptcy problems. Soc. Choice Welf. 27, 231–249.
[23] O’Neill, B., 1982. A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud.
Math. Social Sci. 2, 345–371.
[24] Pfingsten, A., & Wagener, A., 2004. Bargaining solutions as social
compromises. Theory Decis. 55, 359–389.
[25] Schummer, J., & Thomson, W., 1997. Two derivations of the uniform
rule. Econ. Lett. 55, 333–337.
[26] Thomson, W., 2003. Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of
bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey. Math. Social Sci. 45,
249–297.
[27] Thomson, W., 2008. Two families of rules for the adjudication of con-
flicting claims. Soc. Choice Welf. 31, 667–692.
[28] Thomson, W., 2011. Consistent allocation rules. Mimeo.
[29] Thomson, W., 2012. On the axiomatics of resource allocation: inter-
preting the consistency principle. Econ. Philos. 28, 385–421.
[30] Thomson, W., 2015. Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of
bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update. Math. Social Sci. 74,
41–59.
[31] Young, H.P., 1987. On dividing an amount according to individual
claims or liabilities. Math. Oper. Res. 12, 398–414.
67
[32] Young, H.P., 1994. Equity in theory and practice. Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
68
